On July 20, Japan held the election for its House of Councillors, the upper house of the Diet. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito Party lost seats and fell below a majority, meaning they now have a minority status in both houses. On the other hand, upstart parties such as Sanseito significantly increased their representation. This result has attracted attention not only within Japan but also overseas. How will the election result affect Japan’s future foreign and security policies?
This election can be described as one where parties that clearly emphasized change emerged victorious, while those that failed to do so suffered defeat. Parties such as the Democratic Party for the People and Sanseito, which significantly increased their number of seats in the House of Councillors, strongly advocated measures to reduce the economic burden on citizens, such as consumption tax cuts and revisions to social insurance premiums.
Japan is facing long-term low growth and an aging population, making social security system reform an urgent priority. Amid this, continued increases in social insurance premiums and other burdens had heightened public dissatisfaction. Additionally, the LDP had faced criticism over its ties to the Unification Church and issues related to unreported political funds, eroding trust in political ethics. These factors gave voters the impression politicians are being lenient in enforcing discipline at a time when ordinary people’s burdens are increasing.
Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, who was elected as the LDP party leader in September 2024, had previously advocated for party reform as a member of the opposition faction. However, the election results demonstrated that voters did not perceive the LDP as having undergone meaningful reform. Even Ishiba, long known for pushing back against party orthodoxy, was seen as unable to change the LDP.
This critical scrutiny was directed not only at the ruling party but also at the opposition parties. The Constitutional Democratic Party showed a cooperative stance with the LDP, and Nippon Ishin no Kai (also known as the Japan Innovation Party) also supported the budget proposal to achieve free education, taking a pro-ruling party position. However, neither party was able to meaningfully increase their seats in the election.
In response to the rise of the opposition parties, there have been voices both domestically and internationally pointing to the emergence of populism and xenophobia similar to that seen in Europe and the United States. However, the reality in Japan is different. What voters prioritized in their voting behavior was not the exclusion of foreigners but political change.
While Sanseito did increase its seats, it came at the expense of other conservative parties. Many conservative LDP members lost their seats, and the Japan Conservative Party secured only two seats. Sanseito thus attracted votes from already-conservative voters, but overall, Japan has not shifted to the right.
In the wake of the upper house election results, Japanese politics is in flux. Ishiba has announced his intention to remain in office, but he faces significant opposition. As a result of this upper house election and last year’s lower house election, the ruling party has lost its majority in both houses of the Diet. That said, the opposition parties are divided, and it will be difficult for them to put forward a unified candidate to replace the ruling party.
Going forward, cooperation between the LDP, Komeito, and at least a few opposition parties will be essential. How will this affect Japan’s foreign and security policy?
Although Japan’s political situation is fluid, its approach to national defense and diplomacy has been remarkably unchanged. The Abe administration’s foreign and security policies have been carried on by successive administrations. Although Ishiba attempted to propose new policies, such as an Asian version of NATO, immediately after taking office, progress has been slow. Ultimately, the Abe administration’s policies are still being carried out.
The approach favored by the late Abe Shinzo and his successors is to maintain the Japan-U.S. alliance while strengthening multilateral cooperation under the framework of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and developing Japan’s defense capabilities. Notably, this policy involves actively supporting the Japan-U.S. alliance while simultaneously reducing Japan’s dependence on the United States. This policy is still in place today.
However, in the future, Japan will likely push to further reduce its dependence on Washington. The Japan-U.S. relationship is undergoing major changes since the Trump administration took office. President Donald Trump is demanding that Japan reduce its exports to the United States and bear a greater burden in terms of security.
Trump’s actions have been a shock to Japan. However, this will only encourage the foreign policy evolution already underway. Within Japan, the Trump administration’s policy toward Japan is seen as damaging the position of the United States as a reliable ally. The argument for increasing Japan’s independence will likely be accepted without resistance.
Japan’s response thus far may seem to be a desirable outcome for the United States, especially the Trump administration. However, there is no guarantee that Japan-U.S. relations will continue to be as close as they have been in the past.
Since the war in Ukraine, Japan has faced inflation and rising prices, and social security costs have also increased. On the other hand, since the Trump administration took office, the United States has been asking Japan to take on more burdens. The Ishihara administration has been willing to compromise with the United States, but there is no guarantee that emerging forces will follow the same line. All the major political parties in Japan advocate maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance, but there are differences in the strength of that commitment.
In this context, if Japan’s independence increases, there is a risk that it will drift away from the United States. Japan does not officially express skepticism toward the United States, but it is increasing its independence through the strengthening of its defense capabilities and the upgrading of its equipment. In the past, the United States sought to prevent Japan from becoming too self-reliant, but in recent years, Washington has come to accept Japan’s independence, expecting it to play the role of a “proxy” in East Asia.
However, strengthening independence does not necessarily mean moving away from the United States. There is no talk of abandoning the Japan-U.S. alliance, and thus far Japan’s defense buildup is proceeding as the United States expects. However, if independence increases in both economic and security terms, Japan may not be willing to unconditionally accept U.S. demand.
Trump pressured Japan to make concessions by raising tariffs, but the same approach may not work in the future. Ironically, it may be Trump himself who has laid the groundwork for Japan to reject U.S. demands in the future.