Relations between nations can be fragile. Contingent upon internal and external factors – interests and compulsions – sour relations can turn into mutually beneficial partnerships. At the same time, harmonious relations that held out promises for the future can go awry.
India is undergoing such a phase of transformation and rebalancing. Donald Trump’s United States, with the imposition of 50 percent tariffs, appears to have scaled down its interest in India as a checkmate to China’s assertive foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, endangering the Quad. China, also bruised by Trump’s tariff policy, is sensing an opportunity to not just mend ties with India, but also try creating a Beijing-Moscow-New Delhi alliance. In light of these shifts, New Delhi’s much-avowed policy of strategic autonomy is undergoing a reorientation of sorts – swinging from a tilt toward the U.S. to one that is veering toward Beijing, albeit with a continued hope that Washington may realize its mistake and change tracks.
According to media reports, Chinese President Xi Jinping is rolling out a red carpet for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin on August 31 and September 1. Although in recent months, Indian high officials have engaged both Moscow and Beijing on several occasions, it will be an opportunity for Modi, Xi, and Putin to be together on the same platform. A China-India bilateral meeting is on the cards, although it isn’t clear if New Delhi will give in to the Chinese expectations of becoming a part of any China-Russia-India trilateral. It may not be willing to travel on that road, as yet.
Over the past few months, ever since Modi and Xi met at Kazan, a process of normalization of bilateral relations has taken off. A handful of concessions from the Chinese side, allowing the resumption of a religious pilgrimage to a Hindu shrine in Tibet, has pleased New Delhi’s right-wing BJP government immensely. India, in response, has liberalized its visa regime for Chinese nationals. Steps to increase people-to-people and think tank-to-think tank contacts are on the anvil. So are plans to resume direct flights between the two countries, stalled for the past several years. Furthermore, high-level negotiations to settle the vexed boundary issue have resumed through the special representative mechanism.
Underlying this seemingly earnest attempt to normalize relations, however, is a classic Beijing stratagem: an effort to widen the schism between India and the U.S., and attract India into its embrace. A series of statements issued by the Chinese ambassador to India and Chinese foreign policy spokespeople have lampooned Trump’s high tariff on India and urged India not to give in to the “bully.” China announced that its markets are open for all Indian goods in a direct message to Washington, but also with the expectation that New Delhi will return the favor, by putting aside its concerns of being swamped by cheap Chinese goods.
This has been accompanied by the creation of optics of success in resolving irritants between India and China through diplomatic means. The strategy is to ensure constant engagement at the highest level. Take, for instance, the issue of the supply of rare earth metals and specialized fertilizers like urea, for which India is overwhelmingly dependent on Chinese exports. In the month of June, Beijing stopped their supply to India, leading to a crisis of sorts in India’s automobile, electronics, and agricultural sectors. India was the only country to have been targeted for such punitive action by China, even as bilateral relations were warming up. This was taken up by the Indian side during the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi in August and was resolved without much fuss. Beijing immediately agreed to restore the supply of both rare earth metals and urea. While on the face of it, it may appear like a diplomatic success, in reality, it was Beijing’s way of positive signaling by manufacturing an issue only to quickly resolve it.
The Chinese are mixing up their niceties with some hard posturing as well. In July 2025, Beijing castigated an Indian minister who seemed to have suggested that the reincarnation issue of Dalai Lama is beyond China’s prerogative, compelling the minister to backtrack and suggest that it was only his personal opinion and not an official stance. Following Wang’s visit, Beijing also reacted sharply to what it considered an inadequate reiteration of India’s One China policy. From New Delhi, Wang proceeded to Islamabad on a three-day official visit, a move that didn’t go down well in Indian policymaking circles. On previous occasions, the Indian foreign office has convinced other world leaders to delink their India and Pakistan trips. To ask or expect the same from Wang was not possible.
This isn’t to suggest that India is not trying to pay back in similar coin. Modi’s SCO visit is being preceded by a two-day visit to Japan, where he will take a bullet train ride and sign a host of agreements. On August 25, Indian and U.S. bureaucrats held their 2+2 intersessional dialogue to advance “bilateral initiatives, discuss regional security developments, and exchange perspectives on a number of shared strategic priorities,” albeit in a virtual mode. India still hopes to hold a Quad summit meeting this year with Trump attending. While India-U.S. trade negotiations are continuing, India has hired two lobbying firms to repair its ties with the Trump administration.
Notwithstanding these attempts, however, India remains susceptible in the fluid geopolitical reordering and intensifying competition. Its justifications for importing Russian oil, the basis for the additional 25 percent tariff by the U.S., haven’t garnered much attention or support. India finds itself short of allies, with only the likes of China and Russia for company. Whether it bites the Chinese bait or reworks its policy to appease Trump will be keenly watched. To maintain its strategic autonomy, India will need to do more than its traditional balancing act and work on building enduring alliances.