With Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to New Delhi from August 18 to 20, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi preparing for his first visit to China in seven years for the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, the South Asian region is on the brink of significant changes. Most of the analysis on the subject emphasizes the contentious history of Sino-Indian relations, but that ignores another crucial dynamic: whenever hostility between Beijing and New Delhi eases, South Asia briefly breathes a sigh of relief, as evidenced from the period from Kargil in 1999 to Pulwama in 2019. Chinese diplomacy has often acted to prevent escalation between India and Pakistan in particular. Therefore, it’s worth exploring the key question of whether a potential Sino-Indian détente can bring stability to South Asia.
India and China’s relationship has enduringly been defined by mistrust, beginning with the 1962 war that scarred New Delhi’s strategic disposition. Since then, every engagement has been marked by uncertainty, territorial disputes, and competing ambitions. Yet the mapping of this bilateral relation reveals a subtle pattern: instances of China-India engagement have historically coincided with a cooling of India-Pakistan tensions.
For instance, the visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988 resurrected India-Pakistan engagement as well. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003 was followed by the India-Pakistan ceasefire along the Line of Control. Viewed through this lens, the China-India intermittent dialogues were not insignificant, isolated events but instead led to a substantive ripple effect across the South Asian region – very much to the benefit of India-Pakistan relations. Simply put, diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Beijing often coincides with de-escalation in South Asia.
This pattern has acquired renewed significance in the current context. India’s outreach to Beijing comes at a moment of growing friction with its Western partners. Despite closer ties with Washington, New Delhi has faced repeated reminders of U.S. unreliability, such as tariffs on Indian goods, and unease in Washington over India’s continued purchase of discounted Russian oil, often seen by the U.S. as an effort toward de-dollarization. This has raised questions within the Indian political circles about whether the United States can be trusted – a perennial concern for New Delhi.
Apart from these factors, the major underlying trigger has been the diplomatic isolation and lukewarm response from Indian allies after the May 2025 conflict with Pakistan, which has Washington re-evaluating its strategy of relying on India as a counterweight to China. India’s hyper-sensationalist media reporting and extensive use of information warfare, along with the absence of any substantial proof of Pakistan’s culpability in the Pahalgam attack, has seriously damaged India’s credibility on the international stage.
More broadly, the recent assertive diplomatic posturing evident from statements by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, and intelligence adventurism abroad, especially in Western states such as Canada and the U.S., and the policy shift from nonalignment to multialignment in an era of conflict-enriched geopolitics, resulted in additional diplomatic mistrust.
This uncertainty has now compelled India to hedge its bets. India has realized that an overreliance on Washington would narrow the already closing space of New Delhi’s diplomacy, leaving India stranded. So, by moving to normalize ties with Beijing, the Modi government has not only strategically signaled that India has options beyond the U.S.
This pivot also comes at an interesting time for India-Pakistan relations, with China being Pakistan’s close ally and supporter. India would have noticed Chinese analysts like Victor Gao making assertive remarks in support of Pakistan on multiple international television shows. Meanwhile, during the brief conflict in early May, Chinese-made J-10C fighters armed with PL-15 missiles were successful in striking India’s Rafales, thus establishing geopolitical and military leverage in favor of Pakistan – and China.
Hence, the upcoming participation of Modi in the SCO summit and a possible meeting with President Xi Jinping not only showcases India’s diplomatic isolation but also its ability to readjust as per the geopolitical reality.
If New Delhi’s strategy reflects a search for political leeway beyond the West, Beijing has its own reasons to listen. China’s strategic outlook has always been shaped by its economic aspirations and the need to secure reliable markets. And India, with its huge capital and vast consumer base, is too significant to be disregarded. Even a limited economic engagement with New Delhi could provide Beijing with a strategic advantage.
Moreover, even strategically, Beijing has every reason to cool tensions along its western border. The rivalry with the United States over Taiwan and the South China Sea already consumes a lot of its diplomatic and military resources. Easing friction with India would allow China to concentrate on its growth rather than risk being pulled into yet another crisis.
Additionally, China’s investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor gives it an incentive to play ballast. For China, it is imperative to safeguard its stakes in both Islamabad and New Delhi, and to do so, it must moderate the conflict between them, which can only happen in the case of a normalization of China-India relations. Under this logic, Chinese dialogue with India is a strategic and indispensable tactic of Beijing’s broader regional strategy.
If Beijing now sees value in moderating between India and Pakistan, it would not be the first time it has played that role. During past India-Pakistan crises, China urged restraint, such as in 1999 during the Kargil conflict, in 2001-02 after the attack on India’s Parliament, and more recently after the 2019 Pulwama attack, calling for de-escalation.
While Washington often gets credit for meditating in South Asia, especially given President Donald Trump’s newfound interest in mediation, even in the case of recent ceasefire negotiations between India and Pakistan, China has always been a parallel stabilizer: quiet, firm, and largely under-recognized but always present. In moments of crisis, Beijing has avoided theatrics and cautiously steered both rivals toward the brakes. This underappreciated dynamic suggests that if India and China move toward a thaw, Beijing will play even more of a stabilizing role in South Asia.
If a tentative thaw between Delhi and Beijing does happen, the implications for South Asia would be significant. For Pakistan, the immediate concern would be whether closer China-India coordination weakens Beijing’s commitment to Islamabad. But as history has demonstrated, the “iron brotherhood” would not be abandoned. However, India’s reduced two-front anxiety would alter the balance – for the better. New Delhi might demonstrate greater restraint, thus lowering the risk of violent flare-ups. While the success of a China-India detente would not eradicate disputes, it would introduce a mitigating factor.
Despite potential benefits, constraints limit the potential for a thaw between China and India, due to unresolved border disputes, water crises, and concerns over CPEC. Rising nationalism on both sides restricts compromises: New Delhi fears backlash if lenient, while Beijing views concessions as weakness. The deep mistrust rooted in competing aspirations and alliances suggests that any rapprochement is tactical, not a major shift.
Even so, improving China-India relations could stabilize India-Pakistan dynamics, even if only temporarily. This potential benefit is often overlooked in policy discussions, which tend to assume that India-Pakistan tensions depend solely on Washington’s mediation. However, history suggests that warming China-India relations could meaningfully reduce tensions in the region. In the end, South Asian peace might emerge from Beijing rather than Washington.