On August 1, six Pakistani security personnel were injured in a quadcopter attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bannu district. Similarly, on July 23, police and military targets were attacked with seven quadcopters in different parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The deadliest of these attacks was in Upper South Waziristan district, where three soldiers lost their lives and three others, including a captain, were injured when a mortar shell was dropped on a check post from a drone. Likewise, in May, there were at least eight drone attacks targeting police and security forces in Bannu district and adjoining areas.
In Pakistan’s evolving militant landscape, terrorist groups took their time in embracing emerging technologies like drones for lethal attacks and Artificial Intelligence for propaganda. Numerous factors, such as the availability of lethal weapons, the lack of technical expertise, and utilitarian considerations, i.e., the efficacy of more technologically advanced weapons versus the costs involved in developing and using them, shaped their cost-benefit calculus. However, once militant factions in the North Waziristan district adopted drones in 2024, there was a shift in their strategy. As many as six drone attacks by militants were reported in different areas of North Waziristan in 2024.
In 2025, there has been a dangerous escalation not only in the number of drone attacks and their geographical expansion to other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but also in technological sophistication as exhibited in recent quadcopter assaults. As militant groups improve the use of off-the-shelf quadcopters, there is a likelihood of more frequent and lethal drone attacks. At the same time, it is feared that in the next phase of their technological evolution, militant groups will incorporate First Person View (FPV) kamikaze drones.
Reportedly, militants have started using commercially available quadcopter drones to drop bombs on police stations, security check posts, and military convoys. Concerningly, these drones are powered by four rotors, which allow for vertical take-off and landing. Furthermore, off-the-shelf quadcopters are being weaponizing with hand grenades, mortars and improvised explosive devices filled with ball bearings or pieces of iron. Militant groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TT), Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group’s Jaish-e-Omeri faction, now possess and use quadcopters for attacks.
Although ISKP has not used quadcopters for attacks in Pakistan so far, Rocket Chat channels linked to the group released five manuals explaining how to weaponize commercially available drones under the “Modern Warfare” series, clearly exhibiting intent to adopt and use drones for attacks.
Baloch separatists, too, have not used drones; however, given how they embraced suicide terrorism as a tactic, it is only a matter of time before they will weaponize quadcopters for attacks as well.
It has been observed that in Pakistan’s conflict landscape, once a technology or a weapon proves its cost-effectiveness, availability and lethality, they are rapidly adopted. The light and small weapons left in Afghanistan by the U.S. exemplify this. Now, almost all militant groups across the ideological spectrum in Pakistan are using them. The case of weaponized quadcopters will not be any different. For now, the militants are in the experimenting phase and lack accuracy in hitting their targets precisely. However, once they navigate the experimentation phase and gain the technical expertise, weaponized drones will enhance their tactical sophistication and lethality to the detriment of Pakistan’s internal security.
Alarmingly, the militant groups are showing rapid tactical innovation in incorporating drones in their repertoire as a force multiplier. For instance, during the attack in Upper Waziristan, militants engaged troops through an exchange of fire, even as they simultaneously dropped the mortar using a drone.
In 2024, between July and September, there were at least six suspected drone attacks by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, which occurred primarily in the North Waziristan district, and targeted security installations on the ground. The drones used were relatively low-tech – commercial Chinese-made DJI quadcopters to drop rudimentary IEDs onto targets. The devices were locally assembled, plastic bottles filled with 400-700 grams of explosives, which were detonated with grenades.
Then, in October 2024, a video circulated on different social media channels showing fighters of LeI operating a DJI Matrice 350 RTK drone. In February 2025, the TTP carried out an alleged attack on a Pakistani security forces check post in Sararogha, South Waziristan, using a quadcopter drone laden with explosives.
As per the four-phases of the technology adoption curve, i.e., adoption, iteration, breakthrough, and competition, it is safe to assume that Pakistani militant groups have progressed from the adoption to the iteration phase while trying to achieve a breakthrough. The adoption phase of the technology adoption curve points to early embrace of technology by militant groups, marked by a high rate of failure and underperformance. In this phase, their attacks go through repeated trial-and-error to overcome their technological flaws and gaps.
The iteration phase sees refinement of technology as it goes through commercial improvements and becomes user-friendly. The breakthrough phase underlines militant groups’ success in improving their performance in weaponizing technologies. They begin to use them more frequently.
These developments can have far-reaching consequences, such as significant counterterrorism pressure on police and military as well as a rise in urban terrorism, if militants are not denied access to technology hardware. Concurrently, the incorporation of drone jammers in militancy-affected areas is equally crucial to secure check posts, police stations and the movement of military convoys. Also, blocking access to commercially available drones by militant groups requires stopping their illegal smuggling into Pakistan.
To achieve that, the government will have to improve the border controls, on the one hand, and pass laws and implement policies regulating the dual-use technologies, on the other.