In mid-July, after many months of tense negotiations between France and New Caledonia’s pro- and anti-independence parties, a new agreement was finally reached. Named for the town outside Paris where the last round of talks took place, the Bougival Accord would make New Caledonia, which France annexed in 1853, a state within the French Republic that other countries could recognize. But the agreement falls short of granting the independence long sought by the territory’s Indigenous Kanak people.
Some headlines have made it sound like the arrangement is set in stone and New Caledonia has already been declared a state, but that’s not true. Before the accord can enter into force, it must be approved in a referendum, which is slated for February 2026. It must also be approved by the French Parliament and enshrined in the constitution.
The agreement required concessions from both New Caledonia’s loyalists and its pro-independence parties, and it remains to be seen if it will be accepted by voters. Moreover, additional deals regarding social issues and nickel – the main sector in New Caledonia’s economy, which has been struggling since unrest last year – have yet to be negotiated.
The deal will likely prompt “extensive debate” both in New Caledonia and France, according to Australian journalist Nic Maclellan, and “many provisions will be contested by both supporters and opponents of independence in coming months.” According to Denise Fisher, a former Australian diplomat who served as consul-general in Nouméa, “The next steps will each demand cooperation between deeply divided parties.”
If recent years are any indication, the electorate remains sharply divided on the question of New Caledonia’s future political status. The territory has voted in three independence referendums, in 2018, 2020, and 2021. The first two referendums narrowly rejected independence, with the pro-independence side gaining ground from 2018 to 2020, winning 43 percent and 46 percent of the vote, respectively, while turnout rose from 81 to 85 percent.
It looked like the pro-independence vote might increase further in the next vote and perhaps even bring victory, but that’s not what happened. In the winter of 2021, during a surge of the COVID-19 pandemic that disproportionally hurt Kanak communities, pro-independence parties recommended that the third referendum be pushed back to 2022. France refused. As a result, the pro-independence coalition boycotted the vote, and it had only 44 percent turnout, with 96 percent supporting the status quo.
According to New Caledonia’s anti-independence parties and French President Emmanuel Macron, the three referendum results showed that the territory wanted to remain part of France. However, the votes were hardly decisive. New Caledonia’s pro-independence parties see the third referendum as illegitimate due to the overwhelming non-participation of the colonized people. That is a perspective shared by the Pacific Islands Forum, where the Kanaks’ anti-colonial struggle resonates with countries that were former colonies themselves.
The third referendum isn’t the only recent controversy. Last year, as pro-independence parties sought discussions for a comprehensive agreement on the territory’s future political status, the French government attempted to force through a constitutional amendment to radically change the special electoral roll. The amendment, which would have exacerbated the disenfranchisement of Kanaks, sparked widespread protests. Initially peaceful, the protests turned violent, leading to 14 deaths, more than 2,000 arrests, and a severely weakened economy.
The French government blamed outside forces for the unrest, an argument that holds little water and ignores the main causes of the violence, like the tensions that have been growing since 2021, the territory’s longstanding race and class inequalities, and France’s heavy-handed tactics with the electoral roll. Paris received further criticism, both in New Caledonia and across the Pacific region, for its militarized response to the crisis. The French government was seen by pro-independence parties as abandoning the spirit of the Nouméa Accord, the historic agreement that allowed the referendums to take place.
In this context – and after loyalists attempted to scuttle the talks – the fact that France and New Caledonia’s two polarized factions managed to reach a compromise at all is impressive (Papua New Guinea and Bougainville haven’t been able to get there). However, the accord also comes at a time when, for part of the electorate, trust in the French government appears to be at its lowest level in years, if not decades. Those who want independence won’t give up the cause; if they accept the new agreement next year, they are unlikely to see it as the end of the line, but rather a stepping stone to full sovereignty.
The Bougival Accord would create a New Caledonian nationality and allow dual French and New Caledonian nationality, a provision sure to rile anti-independence voters. It would partly open the electoral roll to 10-year residents and some residents’ spouses, a more moderate provision than what France tried to pass last year, but still a concession for pro-independence parties. It would make some changes to New Caledonia’s parliament, with reduced representation from several Kanak-majority areas. The transfer of some sovereign powers would also be allowed, such as foreign affairs, but not defense, justice, or currency.
In his analysis, Maclellan identified foreign affairs as a particular area of friction. The agreement states that New Caledonia must conduct its diplomacy “in accordance with the international commitments and interests of France,” which Maclellan said could lead to disputes over a range of issues, including nuclear disarmament, maritime boundaries, trade policy, the nickel industry, and West Papua. France recently strengthened its defense ties with Indonesia, while New Caledonia’s pro-independence coalition has long criticized Indonesia’s human rights abuses in West Papua and called for West Papuan self-determination.
In other words, whether the accord is adopted or not, friction will likely continue between Nouméa and Paris. Nor is adoption of the agreement a foregone conclusion, and members of both the pro- and anti-independence coalitions will find plenty to object to in it. Meanwhile, despite the adamant statement from Overseas Minister Manuel Valls that the Bougival Accord is only for New Caledonia, the deal naturally raises questions for France’s other overseas territories, including French Polynesia.