In mid-August, the Taliban marked the fourth anniversary of their ascension to power in Afghanistan. During this period, the movement has maintained control over Afghanistan and succeeded in establishing active diplomatic engagements with a number of states, despite the absence of broad international recognition. Many countries now view the Taliban as a de facto political actor, recognizing the regime’s pivotal role in facilitating connectivity between Central and South Asia. At the same time, unresolved issues surrounding internal security and the presence of terrorist groups on Afghan territory continue to raise concerns within the international community.
Against this backdrop, there is growing scholarly and policy interest in examining the nature and core characteristics of the Taliban’s foreign policy. A key question is whether the movement adheres to coherent principles or strategic orientations in its external conduct. Identifying such patterns would not only enhance our understanding of the Taliban’s behavior on the global stage, but also support the development of a more pragmatic framework for engaging with the group and anticipating its future foreign policy moves.
One of the central ideological foundations of the Taliban’s statecraft is “Rohnamudhoe Amir al-Mu’minin Baroye Mujahedin” (“Amir al-Mu’minin Guide for the Mujahideen”), authored by the movement’s leader. The principles articulated in this work have left a deep imprint on Afghanistan’s political, economic, and social order. Yet in the realm of foreign policy, the Taliban’s conduct appears to diverge, at least in part, from the framework set forth in the text – adopting instead a more flexible and pragmatic approach to international engagement.
Traditional Principles
In analyzing the ideological foundations of the Taliban, two core components are frequently emphasized: the Deobandi school and the Pashtunwali code. These elements shape the Taliban’s internal worldview and value system and exert a direct influence on its foreign policy behavior.
This influence is especially evident in the Taliban’s approach to transboundary water resource management. Senior Taliban representatives have repeatedly invoked Islamic principles when articulating their positions. For instance, in May 2025 the Taliban’s ambassador to Uzbekistan, Abdul Ghaffar Tirawi, commenting on the Qosh-Tepa Canal project, stated: “Water should not be wasted.” Similarly, Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, speaking about the Helmand River agreement with Iran, noted: “We consider this a religious and moral responsibility. If a Muslim is suffering from thirst and we are able to help, it is both a charitable act and a rational policy.”
Such statements reflect the centrality of Islamic values as an ideological compass guiding the Taliban’s diplomatic practice.
Elements of Pashtunwali, including its integral component – Pashtun nationalism – continue to play a significant role in shaping the Taliban’s foreign policy conduct.
The principles embedded in Pashtunwali are not only preserved in the Taliban’s rhetoric but are also reflected in specific diplomatic decisions. This is particularly evident when the movement resists external pressure, invoking notions of national sovereignty and traditional worldview. Both historical and contemporary precedents support this observation. The Taliban’s refusal during its first regime to extradite Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s and following the events of September 11, 2001 – despite intense international pressure – has been interpreted by several scholars as an adherence to Pashtunwali. Similarly, the movement’s current rejection of United Nations demands to expand rights for girls and women, and its framing of such appeals as unwarranted interference in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs, highlights the salience of traditionalist norms in its foreign policy orientation. Thus, Pashtunwali continues to serve as a foundational ideological framework guiding the Taliban’s pursuit of foreign policy autonomy.
Sovereignty
The principle of state sovereignty stands as a central pillar of the Taliban’s contemporary foreign policy framework. This is most vividly illustrated in its evolving relationship with Pakistan. It is well-documented that Pakistani intelligence services provided extensive support to the Taliban throughout the 1990s, with Islamabad being one of the few states to officially recognize the group’s first regime. Key Taliban leaders – including Mullah Omar, Akhtar Mansour, and current leader Haibatullah Akhundzada – found refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas during the U.S.-led military campaign.
Since regaining power in August 2021, however, the Taliban movement has increasingly distanced itself from Pakistan. Tensions along the Durand Line, mutual accusations of harboring militants, and Islamabad’s refusal to grant formal recognition to the Taliban-led government have all signaled a growing rift in bilateral relations. Within Afghanistan’s political and religious discourse, there is a clear effort to move beyond the perception of the country as Pakistan’s “junior partner” – a shift that reflects an assertion of both political independence and spiritual authority.
Neutrality and Non-Interference
According to a number of experts, the Taliban’s foreign policy strategy is grounded in the principles of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. This stance is particularly emphasized in relation to Central Asian countries, where the Taliban have refrained from exporting their ideological doctrines, choosing instead to limit the application of Shariah law strictly to the territory of Afghanistan.
However, this declared neutrality is not always borne out in practice. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the Taliban have engaged in regional activities that go beyond the bounds of non-interference. These include the regime’s tacit support for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the associated escalation of tensions along the Afghan-Pakistani border; expressions of solidarity with Iran during the Gaza crisis of 2023–2025; and the emergence, during the same period, of an entity known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Kashmir.
Taken together, these developments point to the presence of interventionist elements in the Taliban’s regional posture, albeit not in overt or officially sanctioned forms.
Political Recognition
Despite holding power in Afghanistan for more than four years, the Taliban have received de jure recognition only from Russia, while the broader international community continues to withhold such recognition. In this context, the movement’s diplomatic activity appears largely instrumental, aimed primarily at securing international legitimacy.
This objective is clearly reflected in the Taliban’s expanding foreign policy outreach – not only toward traditional regional partners, but also to countries beyond the Muslim world. Unlike the first Taliban regime, which was largely focused on Islamic nations, the current leadership has adopted a more pragmatic and flexible approach, cultivating ties with states such as Japan, Nicaragua, Burkina Faso and several other African countries. This diplomatic diversification signals a deliberate attempt to move beyond the conventional regional framework and integrate into a broader system of international relations.
The Taliban also employ large-scale infrastructure projects as tools of foreign policy leverage in pursuit of political recognition. Notably, the Qosh-Tepa Canal project is viewed not only through an economic lens, but also as a political and diplomatic instrument designed to influence Central Asian states. Similarly, the Taliban’s control over transboundary water resources shared with Iran and Pakistan is increasingly seen as a form of strategic leverage – one that enables the movement to assert its agency and demand that its interests be taken into account on the regional and global stage.
Economic Pragmatism
Economic development has emerged as a key priority in the Taliban’s foreign policy agenda. Within this context, internal fragmentation within the Taliban movement has become increasingly evident.
The Kabul-based faction, led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, embraces a more pragmatic outlook, emphasizing the need for economic engagement and development. It is the Kabul faction’s pragmatic orientation that has gradually gained influence over the direction of foreign policy.
This is reflected in the growing diplomatic engagement with countries such as China and India – nations traditionally viewed by the Kandahar leadership as “infidels” – as well as with the Russian Federation, once regarded as an occupying force. Despite internal ideological tensions, the prevailing trajectory favors realism and active diplomacy aimed at economic stabilization and the pursuit of international recognition.
From Traditional Bilateralism to Multilateral Engagement
A discernible shift in the Taliban’s foreign policy strategy is the movement from predominantly bilateral engagements toward trilateral and multilateral formats of cooperation.
This transition reflects the regime’s growing interest in institutionalizing dialogue and fostering deeper regional integration. A prominent example of this trend was Afghanistan’s participation in the trilateral meeting of foreign ministers from China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan on May 21, 2025, where discussions focused on security, infrastructure development, and economic cooperation. Kabul will be hosting a second trilateral meeting on August 20.
Similar dynamics can be observed in recent negotiations involving representatives from Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. These meetings placed particular emphasis on energy cooperation, including the advancement of the CASA-1000 project and electricity exports from Tajikistan. It is also worth highlighting the historic trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan held on July 18, 2025.
Furthermore, since June 2024, the Taliban leadership has begun to engage in multilateral formats under the auspices of the United Nations, including the Doha summits. This participation underscores the movement’s ambition to enhance its international legitimacy and integrate into broader global diplomatic processes.
Priority of Central Asian States
Central Asian countries occupy a distinct place among the foreign policy priorities of the Taliban regime. The Taliban are well aware that the region, particularly Uzbekistan, increasingly views Afghanistan as an integral part of Central Asia, based on deep-rooted geographical, historical, cultural, and infrastructural interconnectedness.
In response, the Taliban leadership has demonstrated a willingness to engage constructively with regional states, motivated by the pursuit of technical, energy-related, and humanitarian support. In this context, Afghanistan is developing projects with Central Asian countries such as TAPI, CASA-1000, and the Trans-Afghan Corridor, which are expected to strengthen Afghanistan’s connectivity with the region.
Conclusion
It can be argued that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan remains relatively young and has yet to fully articulate a comprehensive foreign policy strategy – at least, no official document outlining such a strategy has been made public.
What is evident, however, is the movement’s growing emphasis on diplomacy. Beyond traditional principles, the Taliban’s foreign policy appears increasingly shaped by notions of neutrality and non-interference, sovereignty and political recognition, economic pragmatism, and a gradual shift toward trilateral and multilateral engagement. It is also becoming clear that Central Asia will occupy a priority position in the Taliban’s external agenda. The role of Western states, by contrast, remains uncertain and will likely depend more on the West’s own ability to develop a unified approach toward Afghanistan.