China has once again pushed its South China Sea dispute with the Philippines to the brink of death. On August 11, a destroyer from China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) came dangerously close to ramming a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship and potentially causing injuries or worse, which could have caused the Philippines to invoke its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States.
Beijing often accuses the United States and its allies of “playing with fire.” But this incident underscores how China’s aggressive, unprofessional, and destabilizing approach to securing its illegal maritime claims could quickly spiral out of control.
In extraordinary videos posted by the PCG, PLAN 164 swerved erratically and at high speed toward BRP Suluan’s starboard, missing the PCG ship by mere meters. China Coast Guard (CCG) 3104, which closely trailed BRP Suluan, then slammed bow-first into PLAN 164’s port, resulting in what PCG Spokesperson Jay Tarriela described as “substantial damage” that rendered CCG 3104 “unseaworthy.” At least three CCG personnel were on CCG 3104’s bow at the time of the collision; it’s unclear whether they were injured during the incident.
After the collision, China’s Defense Ministry blamed the Philippines, saying the PCG vessel has “repeatedly carried out dangerous maneuvers, including high-speed charges and sharp turns across the bows of Chinese vessels.” Video released by the PCG, however, suggests that the two Chinese vessels repeatedly crossed each others’ paths while pursuing the BGP Suluan.
This incident, which occurred around Scarborough Shoal in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), is also noteworthy for the PLAN’s highly unusual frontline involvement in what PLA strategists call “maritime rights protection.” PLAN ships rarely engage directly in physical coercion; they usually lurk in the background to support the frontline CCG ships and deter intervention. Yet in this incident, PLAN 164, alongside CCG 3104, chased BRP Suluan for some time before apparently attempting to ram it.
China likely deployed PLAN 164 to punish recent Philippine behavior, including Manila’s Kadiwa Operation to support Philippine fishing communities under Chinese pressure and a recent statement by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. that “there is no way that the Philippines can stay out of” a conflict involving Taiwan. China often surges or retracts forces to punish or reward states with which Beijing shares territorial disputes.
This coercive action on August 11 was one of the most dangerous in China’s decades-long campaign to control its expansive South China Sea claims by force. While this near-miss incident could cause China to temporarily deescalate pressure, it will not change the ideological convictions that drive Beijing’s maritime assertiveness.
To truly pacify the South China Sea, the Philippines, the United States, and other like-minded countries must together secure relative power superiority over China and build influence structures (constraints and incentives) that shape China’s behavior away from aggression.
China Will Not Change Its Approach By Itself
China under Xi Jinping will not back down from pursuing the country’s so-called historical claims to approximately 90 percent of the South China Sea. While unfavorable relative power dynamics had long restricted China’s territorial ambitions, Xi now judges that “a significant shift” in the “international balance of power” has created new “strategic opportunities” for achieving China’s goals. In his view, China has no need to make strategic concessions – including in the maritime sphere – because current constraints will simply fade as China becomes more powerful.
A true ideologue, Xi believes he and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are on an unstoppable historical trajectory to restore China to what they consider as its rightful place at the center of global politics after the country’s Century of Humiliation. Indeed, Xi’s analysis that “the East is rising and the West is declining” has convinced him that China can freely pursue its goals against ever-decreasing resistance.
This ideological framework centers on achieving the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. First described by then-leader Jiang Zemin, national rejuvenation entails China becoming a “great modern socialist country” that is “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.” The CCP’s strategy to this end is the development and application of “comprehensive national power” to achieve world-leading global influence, military capabilities, economic and technological strength, societal and governance cohesion, and environmental sustainability. This strategy informs China’s approach to all issues – including its South China Sea claims.
CCP leaders believe controlling the South China Sea will convey political, strategic, and economic conditions that benefit national rejuvenation. Specifically, China believes this control will deepen Beijing’s influence over regional states; expand its strategic space; enhance its prestige; promote its desired norms; enable natural resource exploitation in territory claimed by other countries; and, perhaps most importantly, yield command over sea lines of communication necessary for power projection and trade through the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Without South China Sea control, China feels acutely vulnerable to containment from the United States – a fear encapsulated by former Paramount Leader Hu Jintao’s concept of the “Malacca Dilemma.”
Xi and other CCP leaders also link South China Sea control to China’s development into a great “maritime power,” a status they see as critical for national rejuvenation. Indeed, Xi in 2013 stated that China becoming a maritime power “is of great and far-reaching significance… for… achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” According to Qiushi, the CCP’s authoritative theory journal, a maritime power can “exert its great comprehensive power to develop, utilize, protect, manage, and control oceans.” China is not such a power because it does not yet control all its maritime claims.
Accordingly, China is rapidly modernizing its military and paramilitary forces to equip the country with a “powerful” navy and an “advanced” maritime law enforcement fleet that can – and will – secure China’s territorial claims against a “strong enemy.” Relatedly, the CCP in 2012 created the “Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group” to coordinate policy related to maritime claims, demonstrating long-term institutional focus on this issue.
Finally, China’s conception of its “core interests” includes the country’s maritime claims, indicating Beijing will not relinquish them. These core interests are threefold: ensure China’s political and national security, ensure China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and ensure China’s economic and social development. After then-State Councilor Dai Bingguo first defined China’s core interests in 2009, CCP officials in 2010 clarified to U.S. counterparts that the country’s South China Sea claims are integral to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The elevation of its sweeping maritime claims to “core interest” status reflects China’s determination to secure them.
China’s ideological convictions, policy measures, and conception of “core interests” indicate the country’s South China Sea claims are not subject to negotiation or compromise, and its aggressive strategy to secure them will not change.
Manila Has Frozen Beijing’s Gains
Beijing was able to expand its South China Sea control in the 2010s largely due to acquiescence from coastal states, including from the government of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (2016-2022). Duterte distanced Manila from Washington and tolerated China’s growing maritime presence in exchange for greater Chinese investments and market access.
Duterte believed open opposition to China was futile, given the Philippines’ weak military and acute development needs. As a result, he sought to accommodate Beijing, including by taking a softer stance on their maritime disputes, concluding a “gentleman’s agreement” that limited how Manila could resupply its garrison on Second Thomas Shoal, and reducing cooperation with the United States. Moreover, he downplayed the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines, calling it “just a piece of paper.” Manila’s toleration of Beijing’s illegal intrusions in this period cemented a troubling status quo: sea-grabbing for peace and economic benefit.
Marcos, Duterte’s successor, reversed this approach, directly confronting China over its illegal presence and aggression in Philippine waters. After taking office in 2022, his government has sought to rebuff China in the diplomatic, military, legal, and information sectors. Diplomatically, the Philippines has bolstered its bilateral and multilateral relationships with like-minded countries like Japan and Australia and deepened its alliance with the United States, including by providing Washington access to more bases under the countries’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Militarily, Manila has hosted U.S. missile systems that threaten Chinese assets in the South China Sea, bolstered military and surveillance infrastructure on its main archipelago and on its Spratly outposts, and reinforced its presence around maritime flashpoints contested by China – including Scarborough Shoal. Legally, the government ratified domestic law that outlines Manila’s territorial waters as provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). And in the information domain, the Philippines has operated a documentation-and-exposure campaign against Chinese aggression through journalists embarked on PCG ships.
This approach has largely deterred Beijing from expanding its control of Philippine waters, even while China continuously operates in this territory. Of course, China could leverage its overwhelming military and paramilitary advantages over the Philippines to destroy any Philippine forces in its path. Beijing has refused this option because it remains unwilling to bear the consequences of escalating to lethal force – namely, debilitating reputational costs and a potential military clash with the United States.
That said, the incident on August 11 is not the first time that China’s aggression has come dangerously close to killing Philippine personnel. In June 2024, CCG sailors boarded Philippine Navy rigid-hulled inflatable boats attempting to resupply Manila’s garrison on Second Thomas Shoal. The CCG personnel threatened the Philippine servicemen with bladed weapons and illegally towed several Philippine vessels away from the maritime feature. During the incident, two ships crushed a Philippine sailor’s hand, severing his thumb.
China and the Philippines concluded an opaque “provisional agreement” shortly after, and Beijing has not attempted to interrupt any Second Thomas resupply mission since. Beijing likely judged that further escalation could lead to death, which would significantly complicate China’s strategic position.
Indeed, at a forum in April 2024, Marcos asserted that any Chinese action that killed a Philippine servicemember would be grounds to invoke the MDT with the United States. “As long as they have actually caused casualties, and it has killed the serviceman… whatever their designation are… That is an attack to the Philippines by a foreign power,” he said.
Just before the June 2024 incident, Marcos reiterated this red line at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He stated that if a Philippine serviceman were killed in a “willful act,” it would come “very, very close to what we define as an act of war,” adding that his “treaty partners also hold that same standard.”
For Washington’s part, a readout of a January 2025 call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo stated that Rubio “underscored the United States’ ironclad commitments to the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty.” This statement mirrors language from the Biden Administration, demonstrating Washington’s bipartisan commitment to its ally.
Escalation Risk Remains High
Neither Beijing nor Manila is likely to cede their overlapping claims going forward. China will keep acting aggressively to press its claims, and the Philippines will keep defending its EEZ. These diametrically-opposed positions create an unsustainable escalation risk that could yield great power conflict.
Of course, the arbitral tribunal has already rejected China’s claims as unlawful under UNCLOS. But appealing to norms and international law has proven ineffective. Since Beijing responds to power, Washington and Manila must demonstrate it through concrete actions that raise the cost for Chinese aggression.
First, Washington and Manila must organize industrial, military, and economic initiatives with themselves and other partners to develop hard power capabilities that qualitatively and quantitatively best those of China. Intermittent capacity purchases and transfers, like the kind the Philippines concluded with India and France, are not nearly enough to address China’s formidable maritime forces and missile arsenal.
The United States’ significant investments into Philippine maritime and defense capacity over the past four years is a good start, but the partners must now deepen multilateral cooperation of the same type. The U.S.-Philippines-Japan-Australia multilateral and the U.S.-Philippines-Japan trilateral should pour more resources into existing capacity-building programs to field multilateral capabilities – including maritime domain awareness systems and attritable autonomous platforms – that negate China’s maritime advantages.
Second, Washington, Manila, and their partners should apply this power superiority to build influence structures that shape China’s maritime behavior away from aggression. This involves proactively altering China’s strategic environment through measures like permanently expanded military operations, missile system rotations, and multilateral drills to complicate Beijing’s operations. The allies should also formulate comprehensive trade agreements and capital alternatives to dilute China’s economic coercive potential, while launching diplomatic and legal challenges to damage China’s global reputation.
The allies should also apply immediate and automatic countermeasures in reaction to Chinese aggression or violations of Philippine sovereignty. These should include multilateral exercises in sensitive areas on short notice, deployment of additional military articles like missile systems, sanctions and tariffs on involved Chinese persons and entities, offensive cyber operations against Chinese persons and government agencies involved in maritime disputes, and legal challenges in relevant courts and institutions. The combination of altering China’s strategic environment and punishing each transgression will compel China to decrease, and over time, cease its South China Sea aggression.
However, this approach will be expensive, coordination-intensive, and carries short-term escalation risks. China at first will likely respond with its own countermeasures, requiring sustained multilateral commitment and careful escalation management. To lower escalation risks, the allies should maintain diplomatic channels to prevent miscalculation and provide China with face-saving alternatives, even while committing to their strategy.
The hardened positions of China and the Philippines constitute a strategic powder keg ready to burst. These proposed recommendations will be expensive and require unprecedented multilateral coordination. But implementing them will convince China that it no longer enjoys “strategic opportunities” in the South China Sea, forcing Beijing to back down by raising the costs for its maritime aggression.