Earlier this month, Kuwait and China announced the near completion of a joint ammunition factory that is set to open in the former’s capital. The move comes against the backdrop of a recent expansion in China’s security cooperation with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Capability gaps, a region-wide push for strategic autonomy, and domestic production ambitions have all advanced China-MENA security engagement. Yet despite growing engagement, China’s lack of willingness to offer the region security guarantees continues to constrain the Middle East’s reception of Beijing as a comprehensive security partner.
To date, China’s arms exports to the Middle East remain modest. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China accounted for just 1.2 percent of the region’s arms imports between 2020 and 2024. This can be attributed to several factors: the region’s reliance on U.S. security guarantees, China’s reluctance to expand its role beyond commercial defense deals, and the relatively untested nature of Chinese arms in combat compared with that of more established defense producers such as the United States, France, and Italy.
China’s role in regional security can be viewed through the lens of MENA’s strategic balancing act between Beijing and Washington. Across the region, states are leveraging great power competition to fill capability gaps, pressure Washington to reduce its restrictions on arms exports, enhance domestic defense production, and strengthen strategic autonomy.
MENA countries have struggled, particularly recently, to narrow defense capability gaps and modernize their security infrastructure. This has increased the appeal of China’s relatively affordable and technologically advanced arms. In April, China and Egypt held their first joint aerial exercise, dubbed the “Eagles of Civilization.” Cairo’s turn to China is partially motivated by U.S. restrictions on Egypt’s acquisition of advanced aerial capabilities. Rising tensions in Egypt’s neighborhood make ensuring effective, modern, and durable defense systems paramount.
Egypt’s military cooperation with China has sparked criticism in Washington, with some calling for a review of U.S. military aid to the country. However, the nascent expansion of China-Egypt security engagement is also arguably prompting the United States to re-evaluate its restrictions on arms sales to Egypt and the wider region.
These considerations are also driven by the recent use of China’s arms in combat, which has increased their global, and regional, visibility. Notably, in May of this year when Pakistan deployed Beijing’s J-10C jets in combat with India and subsequently downed at least one of India’s Rafale jets. In the long run, these trends could challenge Washington’s longstanding dominance in MENA’s arms markets.
The United States, keen to sustain its role as the region’s key defense partner, appears to be adapting by displaying a gradual openness to supply the region with advanced arms. In late July, the U.S. State Department approved the sale of a $4 billion air defense package to Egypt. The deal could see Egypt acquire AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) whose export to Egypt has been restricted by the U.S. due to Washington’s commitment to ensuring Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region. Acquisition of the AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles could be vital to Egypt’s efforts to modernize its aging F-16 fleet.
Similarly, Washington and Riyadh inaugurated the deployment of Saudi’s first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in Jeddah last month, making it one of only three countries in the Middle East (alongside Israel and the United Arab Emirates) where the U.S. has deployed THAAD. This follows a $142 billion defense agreement that was struck between both countries during Trump’s historic visit to the Gulf in May of 2025.
These developments build on a comprehensive history of Saudi-U.S. security cooperation; however, they are also indicative of Saudi Arabia’s, and the region more broadly, strategic balancing act between the United States and China.
Albeit limited, Saudi Arabia has pursued joint security initiatives with Beijing. In 2022, Saudi Arabia’s Advanced Communications and Electronics Systems Co.b and China’s Electronics Technology Group Corp. launched Aerial Solutions, a drone production factory aiming to utilize Chinese technology to enhance Saudi domestic production capabilities.
However, Riyadh has carefully balanced its longstanding security relationship with the United States with China’s growing political footprint. For example, Saudi Arabia cautiously approached the expansion of the BRICS in 2023. That year, the Gulf country was among six countries that were extended membership invitations; however, Riyadh’s notable absence from the 2024 and 2025 BRICS summits reflected its strategic maneuvering. Saudi Arabia has yet to formally join the bloc, though Egypt, the UAE, and Iran joined the BRICS+ in 2024.
However, both the UAE and Egypt’s delegations to the 17th BRICS Summit in Brazil were not headed by their respective heads of state. The UAE sent Minister of Foreign Trade Thani Al Zeyoudi and Egypt sent Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly.
While China’s security cooperation with the region may be expanding, the U.S. remains indispensable to the MENA’s security interests, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. This was most recently displayed during Iran’s June 2025 missile attack on Qatar’s Al-Udeid Air Base, which was intercepted by Doha’s multi-layered, primarily U.S. equipped aerial defense systems. Conversely, China, and Chinese arms by extension, has yet to play any major role in regional security.
Save for a number of diplomatic, and largely symbolic, endeavors – including Beijing’s brokering of the Saudi-Iran peace deal in 2023 and convening rival Palestinian factions the following year for the signing of the Beijing Declaration – China has not displayed a tangible commitment to regional security and stability.
China is playing an important role in the region’s pursuit of security diversification, but the volatility and insecurity of the Middle East has historically meant that regional powers prioritize guarantees over transactional defense deals in their security relations. This has made the United States major regional powers’ preferred security partner for decades.
Intensifying great power competition has primed the Middle East to capitalize on the United States’ efforts to sustain its global standing and China’s growing economic and political ambitions. For the U.S., maintaining its dominant role in the region’s security architecture will rest on its ability to support the region’s defense modernization ambitions. For China, exploring potential bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to extend security guarantees will be imperative to fostering security cooperation with MENA.
These tensions will be crucial to defining the future of the Middle East’s security relationships. For now, the region will continue to carefully engage these dynamics in line with its strategic security, political, and economic interests. China’s place in this trajectory will hinge on the region’s perception of Beijing as a reliable security partner.