On August 17, 20 years ago, Bangladesh was hit by a series of coordinated bomb blasts. Over 459 bombs were detonated in 63 of the country’s 64 districts, in a span of 30 minutes. The bombs targeted government buildings, including district administration offices, courts, and high-security areas in the capital city, Dhaka, such as the Supreme Court, the prime minister’s office, and the airport. The blasts resulted in the deaths of two people and left at least 104 injured.
Although fatalities in the attacks were small, the 2005 serial blasts were a wake-up call for Bangladesh and the world. They underscored the deep and wide networks of Islamist militant outfits.
The Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), an Islamist militant outfit that was set up in 1998, claimed responsibility for the serial blasts. Although the group suffered setbacks in the years after the bombing, it remains a persistent threat. Resurgent Islamist militant activity in Bangladesh following the collapse of the Sheikh Hasina government in August last year could give a boost to the JMB’s fortunes. Over the past 20 years, the group has proved to be resilient, adapting and fragmenting rather than being eradicated.
The 2005 serial blasts were the first coordinated Islamist terrorist campaign in Bangladesh. Printed leaflets found at the blast spots revealed the JMB’s intent to replace democracy with an Islamic state under Sharia law. The purpose of these attacks was to announce their organized presence in the country. The serial attacks laid bare not only JMB’s extensive network, which extended from major urban centers to rural areas, but also the deep ideological support base the group had cultivated over time.
JMB’s ideology, which is similar to and broadly aligns with that of al-Qaida and the Taliban, aims to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh, India, and parts of Myanmar through armed struggle. The group seeks to motivate people toward an eschatological narrative known as Ghazwatul Hind and create a territory that includes Bangladesh, India, and Arakan (western Myanmar). It was the first Islamist terrorist group in Bangladesh to use suicide bombings.
While the 2005 bombings were the JMB’s most high-profile act, they were not its first. The group and its operational arm and affiliate, the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), had previously carried out at least eight other attacks on NGOs, cinemas, and circuses, as well as targeting Maoists, and leaders of the Awami League.
Crackdown on Islamist Networks
For a period between 2001 to 2004, Bangladeshi officials were in denial about the threat of Islamist militants; they dismissed the presence of organized Islamist militants. One reason was that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led coalition government included the Jamaat-e-Islami. As a result, government action on groups like JMB was half-hearted.
The JMB was banned in February 2005, but by then it was too late; the group had already established a nationwide network. There were also allegations that some Islamist political entities, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, provided ideological support and logistical facilitation to the JMB.
Following the August 17 attacks, the government took a tougher stance against militants and launched a major crackdown. The newly formed Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and police arrested top JMB leaders, including Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul Islam. The leaders were later tried and executed in 2007.
However, the government did not initiate deradicalization programs, especially in JMB strongholds in certain parts of the northern and northwestern regions of the country. These are areas where the population is generally poor and religious, with limited access to mainstream education. The JMB has exploited this to recruit from these remote areas.
Additionally, the legal process has been slow. Of the 159 cases filed in the aftermath of the August 17 blasts, over 100 have concluded in lower courts, but cases are still pending in higher courts. The two-decade legal delay highlights major issues within Bangladesh’s justice system, including a massive backlog and procedural failures that have denied justice to victims and eroded public trust.
Survival of JMB
Following initial crackdowns, many JMB members went underground. They relocated and even changed professions while secretly continuing to support the group and generate income. Some key leaders fled to India, establishing sleeper cells. Through operating across the border, JMB kept in close contact with fellow members on the Bangladeshi side and provided logistical support and procured weapons and explosives.
Amidst this disarray, JMB still maintained a substantial pool of young recruits. When the Islamic State (IS) emerged in Syria and Iraq, a faction of JMB rebranded itself as Islamic State Bengal (ISB). In fact, the Islamic State praised JMB and its founder Abur Rahman, in the 12th issue of its propaganda magazine Dabiq. It also claimed that JMB’s “sincere” members later dissolved their faction and pledged allegiance to IS, uniting under its caliphate. IS expressed interest in gaining a foothold in Bangladesh to use it as a base and expand its influence in India and Myanmar. The IS-centric faction of the JMB, which Bangladeshi authorities labels as Neo-JMB, was responsible for the tragic July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka.
The group’s residual capacity lies in its network of sleeper cells and its ability to reorganize under new leadership. This evolution is evident in the formation of new militant groups, such as Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, which was founded in 2017 and began operating in 2019. This new organization brought together former members from various al-Qaida-centric militant groups, including JMB, Ansar al Islam, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh. In 2018, JMB opened a new wing in India — Jama’atul Mujahideen India (JMI).
JMB’s ideological ties with global jihadist movements and Pakistan-based groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba contribute to its enduring threat. In India, JMI has established a presence in states like West Bengal, Assam, and Jharkhand and has been implicated in significant attacks, including the 2014 Burdwan blast and the 2018 Bodh Gaya bombing.
Post-Hasina Bangladesh
Over the past year, unrest and lawlessness in Bangladesh have grown. Additionally, the interim government has been rather lax in its handling of growing Islamist extremism in the country. This provides the JMB and other Islamist radicals with an ideal environment to thrive.
Additionally, many jailed JMB members are now free; several were released after they served their sentence, and some escaped during the 2024 jailbreaks.
While many of them are likely to be inactive due to their advanced age, a dangerous core of highly radicalized and experienced members is out on the streets and remain a clear and present danger. It is highly likely that some of these JMB individuals at large, who include jihadist veterans trained in Afghanistan, are now strengthening and revitalizing a new generation of militant groups.
With elections on the horizon, there is a heightened threat of JMB seeking to disrupt democratic processes.
Twenty years after the serial bombings, the threat from these ideologically motivated groups to Bangladesh and the region cannot be underestimated. The JMB has shown remarkable resilience, adapting and regrouping despite crackdowns since the serial blasts of 2005. This highlights the need for a multifaceted approach that moves beyond law enforcement action to include deradicalization and youth engagement. Most importantly, counterterrorism efforts must be depoliticized to ensure a unified and sustained response, both nationally and across borders.