The small camp of United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent) at Taga, near the Chindwin River in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region, had an unusual visitor sometime in the second week of April. His stay coincided with the celebration of the traditional Assamese Bihu festival in the camp; he also held a series of meetings with senior functionaries of other separatist rebel groups that had camps in that region. The visitor quietly slipped away two weeks later via a meandering route – long before the Indian security agencies received information about the episode.
The visitor was none other than Paresh Baruah, the chief of the ULFA(I), which is a banned separatist outfit in India.
The ULFA(I) became active in Assam in the early 1980s with the objective of gaining independence from India. Baruah is one of the most wanted men in India, who has dodged at least five assassination attempts over the past three decades. He is believed to have traveled to Taga in Myanmar from Yunnan in China after a gap of seven years.
Almost three months after his visit to Taga came a drone attack. In the early hours of July 13, two ULFA(I) camps and one camp of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur were hit in Myanmar’s “Naga Self-Administered Zone.” The camps were around 10-15 kilometers from the border with India. Three functionaries of the ULFA(I), including Nayan Asom who headed the Lower Council, were killed and 19 were injured.
Who executed the operation?
An ULFA(I) camp in Myanmar that was hit by the drone attack on July 13, 2025. Photo via special arrangement.
India, Myanmar, or a Resistance Group?
The needle of suspicion pointed at the Indian Army, which has been combating separatist groups in India’s Northeast since the late 1950s. The army, however, was quick to deny its involvement. An army public relations officer in Guwahati was quoted by the media as saying, “There are no inputs with the Indian Army of such an operation.”
By contrast, the ULFA(I) had no doubt that the drones were launched by the Indian Army from the country’s border zones in the Northeast. A release from the Revolutionary People’s Front, the political wing of the PLA, alleged that “Indian Special Forces” fired about 150 “High End Drones” against four camps along the border of the Indian state of Nagaland and Myanmar belonging to the ULFA(I) and PLA.
Some dailies in Assam and Manipur also claimed that the drone strikes were executed by the Indian armed forces.
In a phone conversation with The Diplomat, Baruah claimed that “kamikaze drones and Heron unmanned aerial vehicles manufactured in Israel and France were used in the operation by the Indian Army and launched from multiple centers along the border intermittently between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. on July 13.”
Speculation over the involvement of the Myanmar army was rife as soon as news about the incident appeared in the media. The suspicion mostly stemmed from an earlier episode in 2019 when the Myanmar army demolished some camps of India-focused separatist groups in Taga and the Second Battalion area in the Naga Self-Administered Zone in an operation codenamed Operation Sunrise, following an understanding with the Indian government. In return, the Indian Army was deployed in the state of Mizoram to check the intrusion of the Arakan Army, which seeks to control Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
However, the possibility of the Myanmar armed forces conducting the latest drone attack appears minimal owing to the changed circumstances in the country. After the democratically elected government was toppled early in 2021 in Myanmar, the military has joined hands with separatist outfits from Manipur to wage war against anti-regime People’s Defense Forces in Sagaing Region. Leaders belonging to Burmese, Kuki, and Chin resistance groups based in Sagaing Region and Chin State revealed details to this correspondent about the cozy relationship that exists between the military and the outfits from Manipur.
Sources in Myanmar claimed that the junta had also approached the ULFA(I) and a Naga rebel group (NSCN-K Aung Yung) to join the war – a request that was “politely refused” since “remaining neutral was preferred by the twin outfits.” However, the military went ahead with the forced conscription of Naga youths from the region, which was subsequently condemned by Naga civil society organizations.
In the prevailing circumstances, it is unlikely that the Myanmar military would open a hostile front with the separatist outfits from India’s Northeast or with the NSCN(K) when it is already overstretched and engaged in a bitter combat with resistance groups in a vast swathe of the country. However, the possibility of the Myanmar military being aware of the operation cannot totally be ruled out. The military junta needs the support of neighboring countries – including India – to sustaining the country’s economy and the army’s war machine.
Some news reports suggested that Myanmar resistance groups might have mounted the drone attacks. However, there is no known resistance group in that remote region, which is among the least populated and developed parts of the country.
The resistance groups active against the military in Sagaing Region are mostly in the southern zone, contiguous with the Indian state of Manipur – at least 430 kilometers from the area where the camps of the separatist outfits are located – and in the western and central zones, which are part of the country’s Bamar heartland. Most of these groups are facing an acute shortage of funds and weapons, which is a reason why the opposition National Unity Government had instructed the Kachin Independence Army to assist these smaller groups and get engaged in the war against the military in Sagaing Region.
Indian Army’s Earlier Attacks In Myanmar
India has targeted separatist camps on Myanmar’s soil in the past.
In 2015, a joint squad of several separatist outfits executed one of the deadliest strikes against the Indian armed forces, killing 18 personnel and injuring 11 on a border highway in Manipur. After the attack, the rebels slipped away to their camps in Myanmar. This ambush was preceded by another in the neighboring Indian border state of Nagaland, when seven Indian soldiers were killed in a similar operation by the rebels.
In retaliation, special forces of the Indian Army launched a cross-border strike in Myanmar, killing at least three functionaries of the PLA who were putting up in a mobile camp. An Indian minister and senior army officer publicly confirmed the incident to the media, although the details they provided about casualties suffered by the rebels were inflated.
The Myanmar government was quick to express its displeasure over the cross-border strike, saying that the operation by the Indian Army had only taken place “along the border.” Sensing the possibility of a deterioration in bilateral ties, India’s then-Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar (today the foreign minister) and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval made a dash to Naypyidaw to ensure continued cooperation on security matter along the border of the two countries.
Earlier, in 1995, the Indian Army had forayed into Myanmar in an operation codenamed “Operation Golden Bird” whose objective was to check the transshipment of sophisticated weapons by a joint squad of separatist rebels (the ULFA, PLA, and All Tripura Tiger Force) from the Northeast. The weapons were being shipped from Bangladesh to Manipur through Myanmar.
The episode was assumed for years to have been a joint operation by the armed forces of both the countries. In reality, the Myanmar military had categorically rejected the Indian Army’s offer of a combined operation. One on occasion during the operation, when Myanmar army had warned a squad of the Indian Army of dire consequences for stepping inside Myanmar in pursuit of the rebels ferrying the weapons.
This file photo shows ULFA(I) chief Paresh Baruah at Taga in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region during his visit to the camp in 2011-12. Photo by Rajeev Bhattacharyya.
ULFA(I) Chief Paresh Baruah’s Visit To Taga
As mentioned, the Indian Army has denied responsibility for the drone attack in Myanmar. However, the strike was preceded by a chain of events that had raised the hackles of the security establishment in New Delhi – starting with ULFA(I) supremo Paresh Baruah’s surprise visit to Taga in Myanmar.
Incidentally, Baruah also visited Taga just a couple of weeks ahead of the 2015 ambush on the Indian Army in Manipur. After his visit to Taga in 2015, a joint squad for the operation was constituted from three rebel groups and the plan executed with deadly precision. It was also during the previous visit that he played a vital role in stitching an alliance of four separatist outfits called the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia, which is now defunct.
Given that history, it was assumed by a section of Indian government officials that Baruah’s trip to Taga meant an agenda to implement that could only mean rejuvenating the armed campaign and more attacks against the security forces.
It is possible that the ULFA(I) chief could be pursuing efforts to form an alliance of all rebel outfits from India’s Northeast, an initiative begun in 2011 when this correspondent interviewed him in Taga. Baruah had revealed then that the plan was to forge a united front of all anti-India groups for a “focused campaign and greater results.”
Adding to suspicions in New Delhi, Baruah’s travel to Taga – from Yunnan through the conflict zones in Shan State – could not have happened without the knowledge of both the Myanmar military and China. Most of Shan State is under control of rebel groups that either have an alliance with the military, such as the Shan State Army (North), or bigger groups like the United Wa State Army that have close ties to China.
China has been envisaging a plan of stitching together an alliance of all separatist outfits from India’s Northeast, which was revealed by a former rebel chief during interrogation years ago. Chinese intelligence officers also visited Taga years ago and stayed for over two weeks at the ULFA(I) camp.
China’s motive may not exactly be the same as Pakistan’s vis-à-vis offering support to India-focused separatist groups, but a conglomerate of such outfits could further its long-term interests in the region. China is certainly not amused with the attacks against the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in Balochistan, which it considers to be as crucial as the corridor planned in Myanmar for access to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has alleged Indian state backing for the attacks.
The Timing: Post-Pahalgam, Pre-Independence Day
The timing of the drone strike is also notable: after a terrorist attack in Kashmir escalated tensions between India and Pakistan, and ahead of India’s Independence Day, which is a potential target for separatist attacks.
In India, separatist groups have customarily boycotted celebrations of Independence Day (August 15) and Republic Day (January 16). Indian security forces are thus concerned with the possibility of attacks by these groups during Independence Day. Security agencies have warned that the ULFA(I) could trigger blasts, as it had done on earlier occasions.
The government would seek to urgently foil any such plot – not least on account of the plans firmed up by top business houses to invest in Assam. One such project is a greenfield project by the Tata Group for assembly and testing of semiconductor chips for use across automotive, mobile devices, artificial intelligence, and other key segments globally. Blasts could discourage investors from foraying into Assam, which is also among the least developed states in India.
Baruah, however, told The Diplomat over the phone that “nothing would be done to hamper the interests of the indigenous communities in India’s Northeast.”
The April terror attack in Kashmir’s Pahalgam, which killed 26 people, was another reason for the Indian government’s concern. India blamed Pakistan’s security forces for supporting the group behind the Pahalgam attack, raising worries that Pakistan could execute such operations in other areas of India in the future. Pakistan, for its part, has long denied any support for cross-border terrorist groups.
Pakistan’s linkages with the ULFA(I) stretch back to 1991, when the first batch of weapons landed in the country from Bangladesh. Ties strengthened in the following years, and especially with Baruah, to the extent that it was a factor causing the decisive split in the organization in 2009. That year, chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa exited, along with other senior functionaries, and began negotiating with the Indian government.
That Pakistan could activate terror groups in India’s Northeast has not been ruled out. It is assumed by Indian security agencies that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence has strengthened its presence immensely in Bangladesh since the collapse of the Awami League-led government last year and has managed to infiltrate sleeper cells into India. Islamist terror groups are active in India’s Northeast, with the most recent example being in Assam when about a dozen functionaries of the al-Qaida affiliated Ansharullah Bangla Team were apprehended in December 2024. This is one reason for the Indian government’s move to expedite pushing back suspected infiltrators to Bangladesh, bypassing normal legal procedures.
The drone attacks on the ULFA(I) and PLA camps in Myanmar thus appear to be linked to a chain of events in the region, some of which occurred in far-off places going back several months and years. In a larger context, the attack – and the many possible culprits – can be seen as the fallout of the geopolitical rivalries among many countries and their ambitions that converge in Myanmar. This dynamic, in turn, has built up pressure to neutralize armed organizations that could serve as proxy forces.