In late June, a Papua New Guinean newspaper reported the signing of a new agreement that represents “A step closer to the Fate of Bougainville Independence.” The headline perfectly expressed what this new development signifies and what it doesn’t: Bougainville is indeed one step closer to its fate, but no one knows with any certainty what that fate will be.
Meanwhile, Bougainville’s independence push is playing out against the backdrop of the same geopolitical competition that is gripping the rest of the Pacific, and this latest agreement was signed on the eve of Bougainville’s presidential election in September.
What Is the Context?
Bougainville is an autonomous region of Papua New Guinea (PNG), lying to the east of the nation’s mainland, and is comprised of one main island and several smaller outlying islands and atolls. It has a population of some 300,000 people, much smaller than Papua New Guinea’s total population of 11 to 17 million.
In 2019, Bougainville’s independence referendum was a landslide in favor of new nationhood: 97 percent voted yes, with more than 85 percent turnout. The referendum was mandated by the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA), which ended a decade of civil war between PNG and Bougainville.
The referendum result was no surprise. Bougainville’s independence aspirations predate PNG’s own independence from Australia, and over the intervening decades, Bougainvilleans have become tired of waiting. However, according to the BPA, the result of the vote must be ratified by PNG’s national parliament to take effect.
In 2020, former Bougainville Revolutionary Army commander Ishmael Toroama won the Bougainville presidency on the platform of delivering the region its independence. Since then, PNG and Bougainville have been involved in a series of negotiations over the referendum’s outcome; the talks have often ground to a halt and have rarely produced consensus.
Toroama and PNG Prime Minister James Marape concluded the latest round of negotiations at the end of June with the Melanesian Agreement. Among other things, it guarantees that PNG will bring the results of the referendum before the national parliament for a vote. The two leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process and to a continuing close relationship between PNG and Bougainville.
However, the deal doesn’t offer as much as it was expected to deliver or as much as it needed to deliver. PNG and Bougainville agreed last November that they wanted to reach a consensus on Bougainville’s future political status before Bougainville’s presidential election, and the Melanesian Agreement fell far short of that.
What Happens Next?
Until now, a parliamentary vote seemed like a possibility, but it was not something that Papua New Guinea had bound itself to. With this new agreement, the PNG government has formally pledged to bring the referendum result before the national parliament, yet no timeline has been announced.
Other matters remain unresolved too, including whether the parliamentary vote needs a simple majority or a two-thirds majority. This has been a major point of contention between PNG and Bougainville in years past. A two-thirds threshold would make a vote in Bougainville’s favor far more difficult to achieve.
Meanwhile, efforts to explore compromises on Bougainville’s future political status, like free association, have gone nowhere: neither side is willing to entertain them. In many ways, PNG and Bougainville remain as deadlocked as they were in 2019.
The question that looms over all the others is whether PNG’s parliament will ratify the referendum result and grant Bougainville its independence or not. If it does not, it raises the likelihood that Bougainville might declare independence unilaterally.
The preference is “to get independence through consensus,” said Ezekiel Massatt, Bougainville’s minister for the implementation of the independence referendum, in an interview in early July. However, if PNG delays the process, Massatt said, Bougainville has “other options” available.
Bougainville’s leaders, including Toroama, have been signaling for years that if PNG does not grant Bougainville its independence, the autonomous region will simply declare independence for a third time. The government has been drafting a new national constitution, which Toroama referred to last year as “a platform that we will be using to declare Bougainville independence.”
Bougainville’s previous independence declarations occurred in 1975, before Papua New Guinea’s own independence from Australia, and in 1990, during the civil war. Both declarations were disregarded by the international community, but that doesn’t mean Bougainville won’t make another attempt, especially if its avenue through the national parliament is closed for good.
Toroama has set 2027 as the final deadline for Bougainville to gain independence, indicating a willingness to ignore PNG’s authority if necessary.
Is Bougainville Ready?
Bougainville still relies on the Papua New Guinea government for the vast majority of its budget, but Massatt dismissed claims that Bougainville should meet a particular economic threshold before independence. While he believes that work on the economy must take some precedence, he does not see it as a precondition.
“We must obtain political independence in order to have some sovereign powers in order to make strategic economic decisions,” he said. “Australia never demanded that Papua New Guinea be economically independent” before PNG’s political independence in 1975, Massatt added.
Wealth from the Panguna copper mine in central Bougainville bankrolled the PNG government in the early years of its independence, once making up 45 percent of national exports. Conflict over Panguna – not only the wealth that was taken from Bougainville, but also the environmental damage from the mine – would later spark the conflict that spiraled into civil war.
Panguna is currently shuttered and would likely take years to reopen. Nevertheless, Toroama said in June that it is “the key to our economic growth.” The mine is estimated to be worth more than $80 billion.
Bougainville also has a large exclusive economic zone, making fisheries a potentially promising sector, although South Pacific tuna is under threat from climate change.
Not everyone thinks Bougainville is prepared for independence. A senior Bougainville government official, speaking anonymously to the Guardian last month, said that independence was “inevitable” but that Bougainville is “nowhere near” ready. “We want a sovereign nation that is healthy, that is viable,” said the official.
The China Card
As Bougainville attempts to ready itself for nationhood, the other question is foreign aid and investment. Last year, Toroama tried to garner support from the United States – unsuccessfully – and stated that he was willing to play “the Chinese card” if other countries didn’t give Bougainville the assistance it needed.
China’s interests in Bougainville are threefold: economic, diplomatic, and strategic. Bougainville’s mineral wealth is well-established. If it becomes an independent nation, it will have another resource valuable to China: the ability to recognize Beijing over Taipei. And finally, China has a clear strategic interest in the region, including in Bougainville’s neighbor, Solomon Islands.
This year, a Chinese state-owned company began extending a runway not far from Panguna, while the United States has withdrawn much of its own regional engagement. Australia remains the Pacific’s largest donor, and New Zealand remains an important partner, but it wouldn’t be surprising if Bougainville’s leaders find themselves increasingly courted by Beijing.
China is unlikely to recognize Bougainville as an independent nation prematurely, but doing so also isn’t necessary to pursuing its interests. All that Beijing needs to do is foster ties with Bougainville’s potential future leaders.
Presidential candidate Sam Kauona ran on a pro-China platform in 2020, and later insinuated that he had received campaign money from Chinese backers. Last year, he praised former Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sovagare, who signed a controversial security pact with Beijing in 2022; Kauona indicated that he would be open to a similar agreement for Bougainville if elected president.
Kauona finished at an unimpressive sixth place in 2020, earning only about a third of the votes Toroama did. Thomas Raivet – a relative newcomer backed by former Bougainville president John Momis, who was well known for his openness to China – came in third place, still with just under half the votes Toroama did.
Kauona, Raivet, and Toroama are once again running in the 2025 election, but so are many other candidates, and the result is anyone’s guess. It remains to be seen whether incumbency will help Toroama win re-election, or hurt him.
The election will occur the first week of September. Regardless of who wins, Bougainville’s next president will face pressure from the electorate to deliver on the same 2027 deadline that Toroama has been promising. Whether Papua New Guinea’s parliament will let that happen is another matter – as is China’s potential approach to Bougainville’s next leader.