The “Big Beautiful Bill,” recently signed into law, has drawn headlines in the United States for its sweeping scope and political heft. While much of the public debate has focused on its immigration provisions and social welfare implications, a quieter but strategically important component of the bill has gone largely unnoticed: a multi-billion-dollar investment to revitalize the American shipbuilding and repair industrial base.
The bill directs tens of billions toward revitalizing U.S. shipbuilding and repairing the industrial base — investments in new dry docks, advanced manufacturing, workforce training, and next-generation technologies. But this is just one part of a broader shift aimed at solidifying U.S. naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. is also expanding maritime cooperation with regional partners, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India, to create a more resilient network of maintenance and repair facilities across the Indo-Pacific.
Despite efforts to expand the U.S. Navy to a 381-ship battle force, the fleet has stagnated. After two decades of rising shipbuilding budgets, the Navy today operates with roughly the same number of ships as it did in 2003. Deep-rooted weaknesses in the American shipbuilding and maintenance ecosystem are at the root of this stagnation. Production shortfalls, labor shortages, and facility limitations have led to costly delays and degraded operational readiness. From 2015 to 2019, for example, three-quarters of all aircraft carrier and submarine maintenance periods were completed late, resulting in over 7,000 days of cumulative delay.
The United States’ naval superiority rests not only on the number of hulls in the water, but on whether ships are combat-ready when they’re needed. Yet the Navy has been forced to decommission ships early and accept slower production timelines due to industrial bottlenecks. Procurement challenges, such as the Virginia-class submarine program running at only 60 percent of its planned rate, highlight the importance of a well-functioning shipbuilding base for operational effectiveness.
The rise of China amplifies the risks from this vulnerability. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the world’s largest maritime force, backed by a state-directed shipbuilding industry outpacing the United States in scale and output. China’s commercial-military fusion allows shipyards like Jiangnan and Hudong-Zhonghua to subsidize naval production with profits from global commercial contracts. According to a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) research report, four top-tier Chinese shipyards produced over 39 warships and 19 million gross tons of commercial shipping in just four years — equivalent to South Korea’s annual output.
Given the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific, timely maintenance cannot rely solely on shipyards in the continental United States. In recent years, the U.S. has begun actively expanding its forward-deployed repair and logistics network in cooperation with regional partners. Japan has long been a focus of these efforts, with American ships having undergone maintenance on bases in Japan for years. In April 2025, the USS Miguel Keith completed a five-month overhaul at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Yokohama facility — the first time a U.S. warship underwent such a deep maintenance period in a Japanese commercial yard. This milestone follows increasing high-level coordination between U.S. and Japanese defense officials, with Tokyo signaling its willingness to expand maintenance cooperation.
South Korea has also begun to play a more prominent role. In March 2025, the Lewis and Clark-class supply ship USNS Wally Schirra completed a large-scale repair at Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje shipyard, the first of its kind in the country. Additionally, Indian shipbuilders have signed Master Ship Repair Agreements (MSRA), setting up the foundation for future maintenance collaboration. While in the Philippines, the U.S. is developing a facility to support the maintenance of unmanned surface vessels.
For these domestic and regional initiatives to succeed, they must be guided by realistic goals and sustained planning. Reviving the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base does not mean recapturing global market share from China, a country whose dominant position is backed by aggressive state subsidies, industrial consolidation, and a tightly fused commercial-military shipbuilding sector. Attempting to mirror China’s model would be both expensive and strategically misguided. Instead, targeted investment aimed at restoring sufficient industrial capacity is a more pragmatic and efficient approach. Additionally, design stability needs to be maintained to provide a more streamlined process for domestic shipbuilders.
Moreover, regional maintenance partnerships must also be approached with long-term coordination and clarity to account for domestic constraints in partner countries. In Japan, for instance, labor shortages and high demand for commercial shipbuilding already constrain capacity, despite the country ranking third globally in total ship output. Expecting Japanese yards to absorb large volumes of U.S. Navy work without careful planning risks overpromising what partners can deliver.
This renewed investment, paired with growing regional collaboration, marks an important step toward reestablishing maritime readiness in the Indo-Pacific. However, only through pragmatic choices about where to invest, how much industrial capacity to restore, and what to reasonably expect from partners can the U.S. establish lasting maritime advantages in the Indo-Pacific.
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