On July 7, 2025, the Trump administration announced a series of new tariffs on 14 countries, ranging from 25 percent to 40 percent. The list of countries subject to tariffs is diverse, and notably includes close allies such as Japan and South Korea – something unprecedented in recent U.S. foreign policy.
At first glance, the countries targeted may not seem to have much in common. However, most of them are more closely tied to non-U.S.-led economic structures such as BRICS, such as South Africa. For these countries, the new tariffs are being applied at an average rate of 25 percent to 35 percent. However, Trump recently announced that he would increase tariffs by 10 percent if he felt that countries were aligning with BRICS to fight the United States.
The next group that will be hit with higher rates of 25 to 40 percent includes the countries that benefited from the post-COVID-19 restructuring of global supply chains and the wave of investment shifting away from China in Southeast Asia, such as Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia and close U.S. partner Thailand.
Therefore, the underlying motivation for this series of tariffs is not simply to adjust the trade balance, but also reflects a geostrategic calculation: to prevent the formation of an economic architecture that integrates the Global South that could undermine the central role of the United States.
In this context, tariffs are no longer traditional protectionist tools, but have become coercive tools aimed at disrupting economic links outside the U.S. orbit. Unlike negotiating trade agreements or strengthening multilateral institutions, the Trump administration is using economic burdens as an unspoken soft deterrent to exert bilateral pressure designed to limit the strategic space of developing countries.
Even more noteworthy is the imposition of tariffs on strategic allies like Japan and South Korea. For decades, the U.S. has tried to maintain a line between trade competition and security relations. This decision to impose tariffs has blurred that line. The 25 percent tariffs on Japanese and South Korean goods are not only about adjusting economic interests, but also sending a message: Washington will no longer grant exceptions to its allies.
This mindset is typical of “transactional diplomacy” – a prominent feature of Trump’s foreign policy since his first term. According to this logic, the sustainability of an alliance is assessed based on a “profit-loss” problem. Tariff policy then becomes a tool to rebalance costs, rather than just a response to trade deficits.
For Japan and South Korea – countries facing security challenges from China and North Korea – being treated as economic rivals represents an erosion of strategic trust. In Tokyo, views in favor of an independent defense policy and less dependence on the United States will be reinforced. In Seoul, the U.S.-South Korea alliance will continue to be the subject of internal debate, particularly regarding its strategic effectiveness. As a result, what was once the foundation of the regional security order is at risk of being reshaped by economic pressure.
The broader impact could be felt in Southeast Asia. With even close allies no longer protected by the U.S. on trade, ASEAN nations will find it hard to maintain confidence in the consistency of U.S. policy. A good relationship could turn sour with a single tariff decision. This will accelerate the search for strategic balance, either through increased intra-bloc integration or by expanding cooperation with China, India and other regional powers.
Vietnam is a special case in this context, only having to pay a 20 percent tax on imported goods as announced by Trump. This is an opportunity to attract FDI, but it is not necessarily safe if Vietnam does not control the origin of goods well. With the U.S. market accounting for over 30 percent of total export turnover, Vietnam needs to be careful in coordinating its trade strategy, both to maintain its competitive advantage and to avoid dependence on a partner with increasingly unpredictable policies.
Trump 2.0’s tariffs must be seen in the broader context of a world order that is shifting toward a polycentric model. The rise of regional powers, combined with the lingering effects of the pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine, has increased the fragmentation of the international order. In this environment, using tariffs as a political tool is effective in the short term but can easily backfire in the long term.
A foreign policy based on coercion, but lacking predictability and institutional commitment, could see the United States cut itself off from the global network of trust. In its efforts to prevent the emergence of an alternative economic order, Washington may inadvertently accelerate that very process, as countries seek to protect their economic sovereignty from the risk of unilateral sanctions.