Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is currently on a three-day visit to Washington D.C., which began with his arrival on July 20. The trip comes during a time of churn in the U.S. relationship with the Philippines, as with other Southeast Asian states. U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff policies have caused much concern in Manila, even as the Philippines, with China on its mind, continues to deepen its security cooperation with United States.
A sound, long-term relationship between these two allies will be difficult to maintain unless the alliance gets its security and economic mix right. This week’s meetings are critical for the two sides to close their gap.
The slew of tariffs unleashed by the Trump administration against its allies and partners did not spare the Philippines. In fact, the initial tariff of 17 percent announced in April was recently raised to 20 percent. Manila is more than concerned, especially as its fellow ASEAN states Indonesia and Vietnam succeeded in lowering their initial tariffs significantly (albeit to similar levels as the Philippines – 19 percent and 20 percent, respectively) in deals with Washington. Meanwhile the Luzon Economic Corridor, a major U.S.-backed project of new investments in connectivity and infrastructure in the Philippines, has made little progress despite being announced more than a year ago.
Soon after being elected, Marcos made a major U-turn in Philippine foreign policy, turning away from his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte’s antipathy toward the United States. Manila is justifiably mystified as to why it should face the same tariff wrath as its non-aligned ASEAN neighbors, when it has done much more to align with U.S. strategies to counter China.
Meanwhile, China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea (ruled illegal in 2016 by an international tribunal) and coercive maritime behavior remain a challenge for the alliance. China’s intrusive behavior has seen a sharp uptick since late 2023, and has continued essentially unabated this year.
Moreover, Marcos himself is politically weaker today than he was a year ago after his fallout with the powerful Duterte dynasty and setbacks in the recent mid-term elections. The return of the Dutertes is a distinct possibility in the 2028 election, with the former president’s daughter and current Vice President Sara Duterte, topping early polls. An economic win will help bolster Marcus politically at home and help improve the prospects for a more U.S.-friendly successor in 2028.
The Trump administration correctly aims to shift some of the burden of mutual defense to its Asian allies, including the Philippines, to save money and keep direct exposure of U.S. troops at a lower level in the South China Sea. This implies greater defense spending by Manila, but also more U.S. support for Philippine capabilities to counter Chinese gray zone tactics in the South China Sea.
Some of this is indeed happening – including help for Philippine base upgrades and projects such as the recently announced boat repair facility in Palawan, located near the flashpoint of Second Thomas Shoal.
However, some U.S. actions are escalatory. The most dangerous development is the alliance creep toward the Taiwan theater. New U.S. military sites have mostly been located close to the Bashi Channel that separates the main Philippine island of Luzon from Taiwan, and far from the South China Sea. Washington has also deployed major war-fighting missile systems to Luzon that can strike at targets deep in the Chinese mainland.
Countering China’s gray zone tactics in the escalatory war-fighting plane, and especially as part of a plan for a Taiwan contingency, is a bad idea. As a recent Quincy Institute Brief argued, defending, not provoking, ought to be the guiding principle for Washington.
Dropping the ball on the bilateral economic relationship only makes matters worse.
An ideal policy mix would involve strong U.S. support for enhancing Manila’s capacities to counter Chinese tactics in the South China Sea, a high degree of caution on any Philippine involvement in a Taiwan conflict, and energizing, rather than damaging, trade and investment ties between the two allies.
Thus, the United States should continue to support the Philippines diplomatically and aim to bolster its maritime capacities and maritime domain awareness. It should also actualize economic initiatives such as the Luzon Economic Corridor as soon as possible. A strategy of non-escalatory balancing by mainly strengthening Philippine capacities in all dimensions is far safer than accelerating bloc formation and expanding U.S. military deployments. A focus along these lines in this week’s meetings could strengthen the alliance for the long haul.
Ultimately the rise of economically capable and autonomous middle powers in Asia is the surest way to both reduce a frontal U.S. military role and achieve a stable and sustainable region. Such a nuanced strategy can help check Beijing’s worst tendencies – but also limit risk-taking by Washington and other Asian states. The Philippines-U.S. alliance could be an exemplar of this approach if both allies want it to be so.