On the sidelines of the third round of the U.N.-convened Doha Working Group (commonly known as Doha Process) meetings held in the Qatari capital on June 30 and July 1, Russia’s Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that Russia should arm the Taliban against the Islamic State. In this context, he further said that “in this particular case, they are our objective allies, whom we must support to arm them in every sense of the word, so that they successfully suppress all these smallest hotbeds of international terrorism.” He said that Russia must support the Taliban with weapons in order to help them eliminate the terrorist threat in Afghanistan.
Emphasizing the Taliban’s role against the Islamic State, he said, “The Taliban is fighting the Islamic State uncompromisingly and harshly.” Kabulov’s remarks demonstrate the shift in Russia’s policy toward the Taliban.
This policy shift was further affirmed on July 3 when Russia became the first country to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
Moscow has accepted the credentials of a new ambassador of Afghanistan as part of a strategic shift in its Taliban policy to build friendly relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, which has been the de facto ruler of the country since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 2021. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that “We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields.”
Such a bold move from Moscow has not come suddenly. Over the past few months, Russia has been gradually moving toward this end. In December 2024, Russia adopted a law to establish the possibility of delisting any organization from the list of terrorist organizations. In March, Russia’s Prosecutor General submitted a petition to the Supreme Court to remove the Taliban from the terrorist designated list. That request was approved in mid-April.
Russia’s paradigm shift toward the Taliban must be seen from the security perspective, mainly vis-à-vis the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) — an affiliate of the Islamic State, which is active in South and Central Asia, primarily in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to a certain extent in Pakistan.
In March 2024, the Crocus City Hall music venue near Moscow was attacked by four armed terrorists, resulting in over 150 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. The incident marked the deadliest terrorist attack in Russia in the past two decades. Russian President Vladimir Putin called it “a barbaric terrorist act.” While the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, ISKP proclaimed it also without directly claiming responsibility. ISKP is widely believed to have orchestrated the attack, allegedly carried out by citizens of Tajikistan.
Russia is a significant target for the Islamic State, and its affiliates, for several reasons, primarily due to the group’s deep animosity toward the country. Many Islamic State jihadists harbor resentment against Russia for its involvement in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent decade-long occupation. Additionally, Russia’s two wars in Chechnya, which occurred in 1994 and 2000, plausibly further fueled anger among jihadists of the Islamic State.
Currently, the heightened hostility toward Moscow is likely a result of Russia’s active role against the Islamic State in support of the Syrian regime. With the assistance of Russian airpower, the Assad regime was able to recapture the city of Palmyra in 2017, which had been seized by Islamic State forces. Furthermore, Russia has been actively supporting groups in the Sahel to combat terrorist organizations, including Islamic State affiliates in the region.
Despite these efforts to mitigate the threat posed by the Islamic State, Russia has not been able to eliminate the danger. Just days before the Crocus City Hall incident, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stated that it had killed Islamic State militants who were allegedly planning a terrorist attack on a synagogue in Moscow. However, the FSB failed to identify or forestall the Crocus City Hall attack, despite warnings from the United States.
There is substantial evidence indicating that ISKP was responsible for the attack. The group maintains an active presence in Afghanistan, and since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul four years ago, its operations have significantly increased. Due to a lack of international cooperation in combating this terrorist organization, the responsibility for fighting ISKP has largely fallen on the Taliban, which views the group as a direct threat to its regime. ISKP has directed much of its hostility toward the Taliban, in turn, prompting the latter to adopt a forceful strategy against it. The Taliban has reportedly succeeded in infiltrating ISKP by targeting its operatives within the country. However, despite these efforts, the Taliban has been unable to prevent the group from attacking other countries, primarily due to its limited counterterrorism capabilities and the various political and economic crises facing Afghanistan since the regime’s takeover. Therefore, Russia’s support for the Taliban in their fight against ISKP could enhance their capabilities in combating the group.
The growing engagement between the Taliban and Russia can be viewed as a practical partnership. Russia seeks allies to aid in its fight against the Islamic State, with Putin labeling the Taliban as “allies in the fight against terrorism” in July 2024. On the other hand, the Taliban requires support to sustain their regime in Afghanistan while combating their most significant internal threat, ISKP. In addition to collaborating against a common enemy, Russia’s recognition of the Taliban government, which could plausibly lead to other countries following suit, serves as a significant diplomatic boost for the regime. Russia was once an adversary of the Taliban, backing the Northern Alliance, which opposed the Taliban from 1996 to 2001.
However, the Taliban are notorious for not acting against terrorist groups using Afghan soil to attack other countries. Nonetheless, the threat posed by ISKP to their regime provides the Taliban with a compelling reason to combat this particular terrorist group. Russian support could enhance the Taliban’s counterterrorism capabilities. It remains to be seen how and when Russia will begin providing support, including weapons, to the Taliban in their fight against the Islamic State, particularly its affiliate, ISKP.