Bangladesh’s political landscape has long been marred by disputed elections and a zero-sum rivalry between its two major parties: the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The country introduced a caretaker government system in the 1990s to ensure neutral oversight of elections, after boycotts and violence destabilized early polls. Under this system, a non-partisan interim administration would oversee general elections.
Every national election not held under a caretaker government has been tainted by irregularities, as one leading civil society figure observed. By contrast, elections held under neutral caretakers (1991, 1996, 2001, 2008) were deemed relatively free and fair, enabling peaceful transfers of power. In 2011, however, the AL government under Sheikh Hasina abolished the caretaker system via a constitutional amendment, a move fiercely opposed by the BNP and civil society.
Hasina argued that normal constitutional mechanisms (e.g. court supervision) could suffice, but opponents warned that incumbents could then easily tip the scales in their own favor.
Subsequent events tragically validated those fears. In the 2014 general election, the BNP and its allies boycotted the polls after Hasina’s refusal to step aside. The result was a foregone conclusion: the AL won 232 of 300 seats, with over half of constituencies uncontested due to the boycott.
Turnout plummeted to around 22 percent, and even Bangladesh’s allies declined to send observers, citing the lack of an inclusive, credible contest. Violence rocked the country: polling stations were torched and dozens died in clashes. The European Union, United States, and Commonwealth all refused to legitimize the sham election. The Daily Star newspaper aptly described the outcome as a “predictable and hollow victory” that conferred “neither a mandate nor an ethical standing to govern.”
In 2018, Bangladesh witnessed a repeat of this troubling pattern. This time the opposition did participate in the election – only to allege it was massively rigged in favor of the ruling party. Sheikh Hasina secured a third consecutive term in a landslide. Her AL-led alliance captured 288 out of 298 seats (an astounding 96 percent), raising widespread skepticism.
Credible reports indicated that ballot boxes had been stuffed on the night before voting in constituencies across the country. Independent observers and media documented voter intimidation, ballot-stuffing, and fraud on an alarming scale.
Many voters reported being blocked from casting votes for the opposition, and some were even expelled from polling stations when they tried. The chief of the Election Commission nevertheless announced an implausibly high 80 percent turnout, promptly dismissing calls for a fresh poll.
For many Bangladeshis, the 2018 election “made a mockery of democracy,” in the words of one opposition leader. Unfortunately, this was not without precedent: a similarly one-sided, boycotted election in 1996 (won overwhelmingly by the BNP amid opposition protests) had likewise triggered a nationwide crisis and mass demonstrations.
The lesson is clear: whenever elections are conducted under ruling party oversight in Bangladesh, their credibility collapses, leading to political turmoil.
The fallout from these flawed elections has been severe. Years of electoral malpractice and winner-takes-all politics have corroded Bangladesh’s democratic institutions, concentrating power in the incumbent’s hands. From 2009 to 2023, Hasina’s government grew increasingly authoritarian, bolstered by parliamentary supermajorities obtained through questionable polls.
During this period, the ruling party curtailed dissent by passing draconian laws (such as the Digital Security Act 2018) and weaponizing law enforcement against opponents. Media were muzzled and civil society space shrank; by 2024 Freedom House rated Bangladesh only “Partly Free” in its Freedom in the World index.
Opposition activists faced arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and even lethal violence. According to human rights groups, there have been over 600 enforced disappearances since 2009. Election campaigns have been marked by deadly street clashes and crackdowns. The 2018 campaign saw thousands of opposition activists detained, and election-day violence claimed at least 17 lives.
Bangladesh at Boiling Point
This democratic backsliding culminated in an explosive crisis in 2024. Frustration had been mounting as it became apparent that a normal transfer of power through elections was impossible under the entrenched regime. In July 2024, discontent boiled over into a mass uprising led by students, soon joined by workers, professionals, and opposition groups.
Protesters decried authoritarian rule and alleged electoral fraud in the scheduled January 2024 polls. The unrest was met with brutal force: security forces and ruling party cadres responded with live ammunition and violence, resulting in up to 1,400 deaths over three weeks, a shocking toll highlighted by the United Nations’ human rights office. Rather than quelling the protests, the repression fueled them further.
On August 5, 2024, Hasina’s government fell under the weight of public fury. Crowds stormed symbols of regime power, and Hasina herself fled abroad amid the chaos. After 15 years of continuous AL rule, Bangladesh faced a power vacuum – but also a rare opportunity to reset its democratic trajectory.
In the aftermath, an interim “national unity” government was formed to stabilize the country and prepare new elections. In a surprising turn, Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus (a respected figure and critic of the previous regime) was appointed as chief adviser of the caretaker administration. This interim government, backed by a High Court verdict, restored the caretaker system that had been abolished in 2011. The caretaker cabinet moved quickly to suspend the AL’s hold on power; even banning the party’s activities pending investigation of atrocities during the crackdown.
While such punitive measures against the former ruling party are controversial, they underscore the depth of the public demand for accountability and reform. Crucially, the interim leadership has pledged wide-ranging political reforms before any new poll is held, with Yunus indicating that elections might be delayed until 2026 to allow time for fixing the system.
However, it remains unclear whether Bangladesh will seize this chance to institute meaningful electoral reforms, or risk repeating the cycle of disputed elections and instability.
A Blueprint for Electoral Reform
To ensure the next general election is credible and to prevent a relapse into authoritarianism, Bangladesh must embark on comprehensive electoral reforms. A few critical areas stand out.
First, the restoration of the caretaker government model should be formalized and protected. As history shows, elections conducted under partisan incumbent governments invite irregularities and undermine trust. A neutral interim administration supervising the polls, as now reinstated, is essential for creating a level playing field. Going forward, constitutional provisions must guarantee that no ruling party can unilaterally abolish this system again on a whim.
At the same time, the caretaker authority’s mandate should be clearly limited to preventing any repeat of the 2007-08 scenario, when a military-backed caretaker extended its rule under emergency law. In other words, neutrality must not come at the cost of an indefinite technocratic regime. A balance can be struck whereby a caretaker government oversees the election for a short, fixed period (as the constitution’s 90-day framework envisages), with strict adherence to the deadline for handing over power to the newly elected representatives.
A genuinely autonomous and empowered Election Commission (EC) is a cornerstone of fair elections. Legal and institutional changes are needed to insulate the EC from political interference. Appointment of election commissioners could involve a multiparty panel or civil society input to bolster impartiality. The EC must enforce electoral laws strictly, from campaign finance rules to equal media access, regardless of who is in power.
In recent years, Bangladesh’s EC largely failed to check abuses by the incumbents, eroding public confidence. Reforms should grant the Commission authority to prevent and punish electoral fraud. This includes policing voter rolls, ensuring security forces remain neutral, and swiftly addressing complaints of vote-rigging. Strong oversight mechanisms, possibly including judicial review or observer verification of results, can add extra safeguards. The goal is an EC that all parties trust to act as a neutral referee, not as an arm of the ruling party.
Bangladesh’s elections have been plagued by violence, intimidation, and administrative manipulation. Reform must target these issues to improve electoral integrity. Key steps include: updating and enforcing a robust electoral code of conduct for parties and candidates; deploying non-partisan election observers (both domestic and international) to monitor polling and count votes transparently; and ensuring security forces protect voters’ rights rather than serve political masters.
Encouragingly, international partners are keen to help. For example, the United States announced visa sanctions on individuals complicit in undermining Bangladesh’s elections (e.g. through rigging or intimidation), signaling that anti-democratic tactics will have consequences. The interim authorities should welcome reputable monitoring organizations (such as the EU, Commonwealth, or Asian election networks) to observe the next polls; a stark change from the previous government, which created an “unsuitable environment” that even deterred the EU from sending observers in 2024.
Technological fixes, like electronic voting machines (EVMs), have been debated; however, given controversy over EVM security, a cautious approach is warranted. Reverting to transparent paper ballots with visible counting may, for now, better assure stakeholders of credible results. This is what the Election Commission indeed decided for the upcoming vote, scrapping earlier plans to use EVMs amid opposition concerns.
A deeper reform conversation is emerging around the electoral system itself. Bangladesh currently uses first-past-the-post in single-member constituencies. This winner-takes-all model has often produced highly disproportional outcomes, marginalizing significant voting blocs. For instance, in 2018 the AL won 96 percent of seats with less than 75 percent of the popular vote. In earlier contests one party’s sweep left the other virtually unrepresented in Parliament. Such distortions fuel the all-or-nothing mentality of Bangladesh’s politics.
Some stakeholders now advocate for introducing proportional representation to make Parliament more reflective of the popular vote. Smaller parties, including Islamist and new citizen movements, argue that proportional representation would give them a toehold and reduce the dominance of the two big parties. However, this proposal faces practical and constitutional hurdles. The current constitution explicitly mandates 300 single-member constituencies, so adopting proportional representation would require major amendments and public buy-in. Moreover, as experts caution, Bangladesh’s electorate is unfamiliar with proportional representation, and a sudden switch could sow confusion or instability.
Reformers must tread carefully, perhaps considering mixed systems (combining first-past-the-post and a proportional representation top-up) or incremental pilots. The overarching aim should be to make elections more inclusive, so that even losing parties feel represented to some degree, mitigating the “sore loser” phenomenon that often leads to boycotts or street protests.
Lastly, electoral reform in Bangladesh cannot succeed without parallel reforms in political culture and legal frameworks governing parties. The vicious cycle of boycott and repression must end. This entails all major parties agreeing to respect the rules of the game: i.e. accepting election results deemed free by credible observers, and refraining from extraconstitutional agitation or violence. In return, ruling parties must refrain from abusing state machinery to persecute opponents. Laws that are frequently misused to harass opposition activists (such as broad sedition or media laws) should be reviewed or repealed, to foster an environment where opposition parties can campaign freely.
Additionally, the practice of blanket bans on parties (as happened with Jamaat-e-Islami, and now the AL itself under the interim government) is a double-edged sword. While there may be justification in cases of violent extremism, wholesale bans risk disenfranchising large segments of the populace and driving politics underground. A more sustainable approach is to allow inclusive participation under a robust legal framework that holds individuals accountable for violence or corruption, rather than outlawing entire political organizations outright. In short, rule of law must replace rule by force or fiat in the political arena.
A Can’t-Miss Opportunity
Bangladesh now has the opportunity to write a new chapter in its democratic development. The traumatic events of 2024 laid bare the consequences of failing to fix a broken electoral system. Encouragingly, there is momentum, domestically and internationally, to support genuine reforms.
The interim caretaker government, born out of national consensus (and despair), has an opportunity to implement changes that politicians long dodged. These reforms, if done right, can ensure that future elections are free, fair, and widely accepted by all parties. That, in turn, is the only durable foundation for political stability in Bangladesh.
The international community is watching closely. Bangladesh’s partners in the region and beyond have a stake in its democratic health. Western nations have already applied gentle pressure (such as the U.S. visa restrictions and U.N. warnings against political violence) to encourage a credible electoral process. Neighboring countries, too, would benefit from a stable and democratic Bangladesh, rather than a crisis-prone one. For Bangladesh’s 170 million citizens, the stakes are even higher: free and fair elections mean they can choose their leaders peacefully and hold them accountable, without resorting to the streets or suffering state brutality.
One might conclude that the case for electoral reform in Bangladesh is overwhelming. The evidence – decades of disputed polls, governance failures, and civil unrest – establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the status quo was untenable. What is required now is a set of reforms that can uphold the rule of law and the people’s right to choose their government.
Ultimately, credible elections are a national imperative. If Bangladesh can institutionalize a fair electoral system, with neutral caretakers, strong institutions, and inclusive rules, it will go a long way toward breaking the cycle of “battling begums” and putting democracy on a stable footing. The path ahead is challenging, but the alternative – a return to electoral farce and authoritarian drift – is simply not an option the country can afford again. Now is the time to get it right, and to ensure that Bangladesh’s next elections mark the beginning of a genuinely democratic era, rather than just another contested chapter in its history.