In 2025, the U.S. urged key Asian allies, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, to significantly increase their defense budgets to 5 percent of GDP. This request mirrors a historical parallel to the 1950s, when the U.S. pressured NATO countries to raise defense spending in response to Soviet threats. Today, the geopolitical landscape is similarly shaped by the rise of China and the ongoing North Korean challenge, creating comparable strategic imperatives for U.S. allies in Asia.
Drawing from NATO’s early Cold War defense strategy, this article explores the lessons from NATO’s post-WWII experience and offers specific policy recommendations for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan as they navigate contemporary defense spending debates in the context of shifting global security dynamics.
NATO’s Defense Spending After WWII: A Post-War Strategic Shift
The aftermath of World War II left Europe economically and militarily devastated. The U.S. sought to rebuild Europe as a stable region capable of countering the growing Soviet threat. One key aspect of this strategy was encouraging European countries to take on more responsibility for their own defense rather than relying entirely on U.S. military support. The creation of NATO in 1949 was a critical step in this process, aiming to establish a collective security framework to counter Soviet expansion in Europe.
By the early 1950s, NATO’s defense strategy faced a critical issue: the U.S. could not bear the full cost of defending Europe alone. It needed its European allies to increase their defense spending to ensure NATO could effectively counter Soviet threats. At the same time, many European economies were still recovering from the devastation of war, and political resistance to military spending was strong. Countries like France, Italy, and West Germany had low defense budgets, partly due to their war-torn economies, though West Germany’s recovery began to accelerate in the mid-1950s under U.S. guidance. Even the U.K., with its well-established military, faced significant post-war financial constraints.
Despite substantial U.S. financial aid, including the Marshall Plan, NATO countries hesitated to increase defense spending significantly, fearing it would impede their economic recovery. In response, the U.S. pushed NATO allies to allocate more of their GDP to defense and modernize their military forces, but the response was uneven. Countries like France and Italy struggled with fragmented military infrastructure, and the costs of modernization — particularly in radar technologies and strengthening conventional forces — further complicated the situation.
In the mid-1950s, under U.S. pressure, NATO saw gradual increases in defense spending, though the response varied among members. This shift was exemplified by the establishment of NATO’s Integrated Military Command and the role of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), which helped streamline NATO’s defense planning and coordination. By the mid-1950s, NATO countries increasingly recognized the necessity of strengthening their military capabilities to address the growing Soviet threat, and defense spending began to align more closely with Cold War requirements, though progress was uneven.
Lessons from NATO’s Early Cold War Experience
The U.S. push for NATO countries to raise defense spending in the 1950s offers valuable lessons for today’s U.S. allies in East Asia, particularly South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. While the geopolitical dynamics have evolved, the challenges NATO faced during the early Cold War are remarkably similar to those faced by these Asian countries today.
In the 1950s, NATO countries struggled with inefficiencies in their defense spending. Many countries allocated funds to outdated or redundant systems that failed to address the evolving Soviet threat.
For example, the U.K., which had already developed its own nuclear capabilities by the early 1950s, continued to focus on conventional forces for a period, before transitioning to modernizing its nuclear deterrence strategy.
Similarly, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan must ensure that any increase in their defense budgets focuses on modernizing military capabilities rather than expanding traditional spending. South Korea, for example, should focus on prioritizing investments in anti-ballistic missile capabilities, such as the AIM-174B, along with its own indigenous missile defense systems to address North Korea’s escalating missile threats. Japan should focus on enhancing its cyber defense capabilities and expanding its counter-strike capabilities to target North Korean missile and military assets, addressing growing missile and nuclear threats from North Korea. Meanwhile, Taiwan should continue to develop its asymmetric warfare strategies, such as anti-ship missiles and advanced air defense systems, to bolster its deterrence capabilities against China’s growing military expansion. Emphasizing capabilities that allow Taiwan to deny China’s power projection remains central to Taiwan’s defense strategy.
In addition, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan must prioritize investments in emerging technologies such as cyber defense and artificial intelligence-driven systems. These technologies are crucial for countering the evolving threats posed by North Korea and China, and should be integrated into their long-term defense modernization strategies.
The Burden-Sharing Challenge
In the early Cold War, NATO struggled with burden-sharing as the U.S. was the primary defense provider, and European countries were slow to increase their defense budgets. In the 1950s, NATO members faced challenges in meeting defense spending targets, especially as many countries were still recovering from WWII. The NATO Lisbon Conference (1952) was significant in setting the framework for defense planning and establishing guidelines for burden-sharing within the alliance.
However, countries like France and Italy only gradually met defense spending targets over time. South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan face a similar challenge today, with the U.S. remaining the key security provider in East Asia, but increasingly pushing its allies to take more responsibility for their own defense.
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should gradually increase their defense spending, with clear milestones and timelines. For example, informal cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should focus on shared missile defense initiatives, including intelligence sharing, research and development of high-tech anti-ballistic missile systems, and joint military exercises. Increases in defense spending should be tied to operational goals, such as upgrading missile defense infrastructure and developing shared military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.
Navigating Domestic Resistance to Military Spending
One of NATO’s challenges in the 1950s was managing domestic resistance to higher defense spending. Many European countries were reluctant to increase military budgets while still recovering from WWII. Similarly, Japan, with its pacifist constitution, and South Korea, focused on economic priorities, must navigate public sentiment carefully when it comes to defense spending.
To address these challenges, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should invest in public diplomacy campaigns that frame defense spending as essential for national security. Japan, for example, could highlight its role in regional security within the Indo-Pacific, positioning defense spending as a necessary measure against China’s maritime expansion. South Korea could emphasize its increased defense spending as a direct response to North Korea’s missile provocations, reassuring its citizens of its defensive intent. Taiwan, due to its unique geopolitical position, should stress its critical role in maintaining regional stability and its need to bolster defense capabilities to counter China’s growing military power, while safeguarding its right to self-defense.
Enhancing Defense Interoperability
In the early Cold War, NATO’s fragmented military infrastructure made defense planning difficult. The U.S. played a central role in coordinating NATO’s defense strategies, helping NATO members work together. Similarly, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan must ensure their military infrastructure is modernized and aligned with regional security priorities. NATO’s experience shows the value of joint military exercises and interoperability between forces. By the mid-1950s, NATO had developed joint operations protocols, enhancing coordination and making NATO forces operate more effectively together.
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should prioritize joint military exercises and interoperability training to ensure that their forces can act together effectively in defense of regional stability. While Taiwan’s formal integration into a regional missile defense system would present significant diplomatic and geopolitical challenges due to its unique international status, informal cooperation and information-sharing among the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan can still contribute to a coordinated response to North Korea’s missile threats and China’s growing military capabilities. Additionally, investing in shared intelligence capabilities and cyber defense systems will improve interoperability and collective defense readiness.
Policy Recommendations for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan
Drawing from the lessons of NATO’s early Cold War experience, several policy recommendations can assist South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in effectively increasing their defense spending while addressing modern geopolitical challenges.
Rather than simply increasing defense budgets, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should focus on modernizing their military forces to meet the 21st-century strategic challenges posed by North Korea and China. South Korea, for instance, should accelerate the enhancement of its missile defense capabilities and increase its procurement of small diameter bombs (SDB I & II), which are highly effective in targeting North Korean transporter erector launchers (TELs). Japan should prioritize investments in advanced missile defense systems, such as Aegis-equipped destroyers and the upcoming Aegis system-equipped vessels (ASEV), to enhance its ballistic missile defense capabilities. Additionally, strengthening cyber defense capabilities through initiatives like the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ Cyber Defense Group and collaborating with the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) is crucial to protect against emerging cyber threats. Enhancing maritime defense assets, including submarines, aircraft, and other naval platforms, will ensure Japan’s readiness to counter regional threats effectively. Taiwan, facing an increasing military threat from China, should continue developing anti-ship capabilities like the Hsiung Feng III missiles, while strengthening its asymmetric warfare strategy. This includes enhancing air defense systems, such as the Tien Kung (Sky Bow) systems, to better counter China’s growing naval and missile capabilities.
To address the growing defense burden, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan must collaborate closely with the U.S. to share the financial burden of defense spending and enhance their collective strategic capabilities. While formal quadrilateral defense agreements may be challenging due to Taiwan’s unique geopolitical status, informal collaboration between the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan — particularly in areas like missile defense, intelligence sharing, and maritime security — can still enhance regional security. This cooperation should emphasize shared missile defense initiatives, leveraging Taiwan’s technological advancements, intelligence sharing, and maritime security efforts that can enhance the collective defense capabilities of the region.
Building strong domestic support for increased defense spending is critical to avoid the political challenges NATO faced in the 1950s. Public education campaigns should highlight the necessity of defense spending in the face of growing regional threats, particularly from North Korea and China. In Japan, these campaigns could emphasize Japan’s role in regional collective security, while South Korea could frame its defense spending as a direct response to North Korea’s missile provocations, ensuring the public understands its defensive purpose.
Finally, to enhance defense capabilities and ensure seamless coordination, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan must prioritize enhancing their defense interoperability. This can be achieved by investing in joint military exercises and interoperability training, particularly in critical areas like missile defense and cyber defense. Furthermore, creating regional defense task forces focused on common threats—such as North Korea’s missile program and China’s expanding maritime power—will improve strategic effectiveness and readiness, ensuring that the countries can respond efficiently to shared security challenges.
Moving Forward: Strengthening Defense Posture in East Asia
The U.S. push for increased defense spending from its Asian allies mirrors the Cold War-era experience of NATO, where U.S. pressure led to gradual but necessary increases in defense capabilities. By focusing on strategic modernization, burden-sharing, and public engagement, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan — each with their unique challenges — can effectively navigate the defense spending debate. Ensuring that their defense budgets are strategically aligned and sustainable will be crucial to strengthening their collective defense posture in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. By drawing from NATO’s early Cold War experiences, these countries can better navigate the challenges of modern security dynamics.