U.S.-China relations are increasingly caught in a spiral of mutual suspicion and reactive escalation. In June, China’s navy deployed its dual aircraft carrier groups — Liaoning and Shandong — beyond the Second Island Chain for the first time, conducting more than 700 aerial sorties near Japan’s exclusive economic zone. For many in Washington, this unprecedented move signaled a heightened risk of imminent conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing has intensified its gray-zone pressure tactics, including underwater cable cutting and illegal sand dredging near the island. These developments appear to confirm fears of a looming military showdown.
But a closer look suggests otherwise. These military maneuvers, while visually forceful, are not necessarily preludes to war. Instead, they reflect a strategy of shaping; an attempt by Beijing to project strength, shift psychological balance, and alter the perception of risks and costs associated with a Taiwan contingency. Rather than an operational rehearsal for invasion, China’s dual-carrier deployment was a carefully staged demonstration, meant to be seen and interpreted, not executed.
To break this strategic deadlock, the United States must act along two lines. First, it must correct its misreadings of Beijing’s intent — particularly the assumption that escalation always signals aggression. Second, it must counter China’s shaping tactics with shaping of its own: not by escalating further, but by designing a stable, disciplined strategic framework that reduces misperceptions and restores regional predictability.
There are two major misinterpretations currently prevalent in Washington. The first is the belief that China is preparing for a military takeover of Taiwan, and thus must be deterred at all costs. This view ignores the dual-layered structure of China’s actions — tactically high-profile, but strategically delayed. The second is the assumption that China’s gray-zone operations indicate a wholesale rejection of dialogue or restraint. In truth, these ambiguous actions are calibrated to apply pressure without crossing a red line, allowing Beijing to retain space for negotiation or de-escalation if needed.
These misreadings stem from deeper differences in strategic foundation. The United States has long been shaped by the Clausewitzian tradition, which views war as the continuation of politics by other means. It reads escalation as a linear function of political failure. By contrast, Xi Jinping operates under a more Sun Tzu-inspired philosophy — winning without fighting, shaping the environment through position, and defeating the opponent’s will rather than its forces. The Chinese approach resembles a game of Go more than a game of chess: the goal is not to capture the king, but to slowly surround the board.
In this context, the United States should build a dual-track strategic framework focused on perceptual adjustment and military stability. This doesn’t mean reducing deterrence, but rather calibrating it to avoid unnecessary provocation. Power should be paired with poise.
Several low-cost, high-impact measures could help defuse current tensions. The U.S. could reaffirm its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue — not as a concession, but as a return to disciplined language around the One China policy. Reopening military-to-military communication channels would reduce the risk of tactical encounters escalating into strategic crises. Meanwhile, regularizing Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South and East China Seas — but doing so in a de-dramatized manner — could sustain presence without unnecessarily signaling aggression. These moves do not weaken America’s position; they clarify it.
Beyond this, the U.S. should develop a layered response to China’s varied strategic goals. When Beijing attempts to shift narratives through encirclement or coercion, Washington should counter with informational influence, boosting Taiwan’s societal confidence and global narrative positioning. In the face of regional military pressure, strengthening joint operational readiness with allies such as Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan can create resilient, fast-response mechanisms — without forward-deploying in ways that might provoke miscalculation. On the diplomatic front, the United States must expand its influence in the Global South — not through confrontation, but by offering viable alternatives in technology, infrastructure, and finance. In a world of contested power, competition over ideas and access is often more decisive than military moves.
At the same time, institutionalizing crisis management is crucial. The U.S. and China should explore avenues for strategic stability talks on AI use in warfare, nuclear transparency, and space security. Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy — bringing together scholars, retired officials, and military experts — can help create informal buffers when formal ties are strained. And cooperation on “side-issues” like peacekeeping, global health, and climate should be seen not as distractions, but as stabilizing side rails that can keep competition from derailing into confrontation.
None of this requires assuming China will become a benign partner. Rather, it reflects a mature recognition that even among competitors, guardrails are essential. Beijing is unlikely to unilaterally de-escalate. But if the stronger actor — Washington — makes the first move, Beijing may well respond in kind. The goal is not friendship, but control: over tempo, over escalation, and over perception.
Global leadership in the 21st century is not about outmuscling rivals at every turn. It is about staying calm in the face of chaos, shaping the environment with foresight, and preventing adversaries from dictating the terms of engagement. The U.S. does not need to “win” against China in a military sense. It needs to steady the Taiwan Strait, deny Beijing the strategic rewards of coercion, and prevent the world from falling for the illusion of inevitability.
In the game of Go, the victor is not the player who captures the most pieces, but the one who sees the shape of the board first. The United States must see that shape now—before misreading turns into miscalculation, and miscalculation into crisis.