Recent exercises by China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), reveal a shift toward large-scale, integrated joint operations that involve different military services and theater commands. Historically, PLA exercises tended to emphasize individual service capabilities – for instance, air force formations in flight drills; naval maneuvers centered on warships, army firepower, and amphibious exercises; or the PLA Rocket Force’s Tianjian (Sky Sword) missile drills. Even when joint exercises occurred, they rarely spanned both service branches and theater commands.
However, since 2022, the PLA has increasingly normalized its “joint combat readiness patrols” and launched major joint exercises specifically targeting Taiwan. These differ fundamentally from tactical-level drills and have begun adopting campaign-level scenarios aimed at rehearsing “joint operations against large islands.” The PLA has also started categorizing exercises by echelon, emphasizing realism and standardizing large-scale annual drills targeting Taiwan.
While the Eastern Theater Command generally takes the lead in these exercises, the scope now spans the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. This reflects the PLA’s evolving concept of joint operations involving not only the Eastern Theater Command, but also the Southern Theater Command (for enforcing maritime blockades), the Central Theater Command (for reserve forces and staging), and the Northern Theater Command (where China’s aircraft carriers are based).
Command and control over these dispersed assets is now centrally managed through the Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Operations Command Center, testing how well post-reform PLA command systems can function across theaters.
Another noteworthy development is the inclusion of the China Coast Guard, under the People’s Armed Police, in PLA exercises. For instance, in the 2025 “Strait Thunder A” exercise, the PLA employed not only its Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Forces but also deployed China Coast Guard vessels as part of harassment operations near Taiwan. This marks a significant expansion from previous PLA exercises, underscoring that the threat to Taiwan is not only technological, but also strategic and psychological. These developments pose direct challenges to Taiwan’s national defense strategy and societal resilience.
While “Four-Sea Coordination” – involving the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea – remains a foundational principle in PLA operations, military actions across these areas inevitably trigger anxiety among neighboring states in the First Island Chain. Such reactions could lead to third-party involvement in the Taiwan Strait crisis, an outcome Beijing wishes to avoid.
To mitigate this risk, China seeks to frame its military activities as strictly targeting “Taiwan independence forces” to reassure the international community. Nonetheless, given rising tensions and interaction among Indo-Pacific states, regional actors increasingly view China’s moves through a lens of mutual insecurity and strategic opposition.
For Japan, the threat from the PLA is not geographically limited to the East China Sea or Taiwan Strait. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, joint China-Russia military activities have extended into the Sea of Japan and even the Western Pacific, raising alarms in Tokyo. During the Cold War, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and U.S. troops stationed in Japan prioritized defending Hokkaido from a Soviet invasion. Now, even with tensions in the Taiwan Strait escalating, if Russia were to conduct military exercises around the Southern Kurils (which Japan claims at its Northern Territories), the Sea of Japan, or the Sea of Okhotsk, Japan might once again shift its defense focus from the southwestern islands to northern regions like Hokkaido and Niigata.
This diversion of Japanese and U.S. forces away from the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea would weaken forward deterrence in those areas. As China-Russia ties deepen, strategic dispersion of adversary resources could be a deliberate goal of Beijing’s planning.
The example of Japan is not a unique case. Rather than attempting to soften the “China threat” narrative through diplomacy, Beijing may find it more effective to apply the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” By strengthening diplomatic ties with countries that have their own regional adversaries, China can indirectly constrain potential third-party interventions in a Taiwan contingency. After all, nations prioritize threats that directly impact their own security.
For South Korea, North Korea remains the principal threat. For Japan, Russia presents an immediate northern challenge. For India, it is Pakistan. By cultivating these geopolitical fractures, Beijing’s strategy of building “strategic partnerships” not only shapes regional security dynamics but also poses a more complex and evolving threat to the stability of the Taiwan Strait.