When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, many in the West still hoped that deepening economic ties would eventually nudge China toward liberalization. Over a decade later, that optimism is gone. China has become more authoritarian domestically, increasingly assertive internationally, and notably more difficult to predict. In 2018, U.S. analysts Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner famously declared in Foreign Affairs that the decades-long strategy of engagement with China had failed. Their blunt assessment catalyzed a strategic rethink in Washington – one that gave China specialists a seat at the strategic policy table.
Europe, by contrast, has struggled to make the same adjustment. While its leaders increasingly view China as a “systemic rival,” most European capitals still treat China expertise as a background resource, not a strategic asset. The result is a dangerous “China expertise gap” that undermines Europe’s coherence, credibility, and capacity to respond decisively to Beijing’s global assertiveness. Closing this gap is now a strategic imperative.
The U.S. Model: Institutionalizing Expertise as Infrastructure
The United States demonstrates vividly how institutionalizing China expertise can significantly strengthen national strategy. Leading think tanks – including the Council on Foreign Relations, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, and the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis – act as talent pipelines, where analysts routinely rotate into government roles. Under the Biden administration, this integration deepened further. In late 2022, the State Department launched “China House,” a dedicated coordination hub bringing together experts across regional and functional bureaus to sharpen China policy.
The results are tangible. Academic researcher Adrian Zenz’s documentation of human rights abuses in Xinjiang directly informed U.S. sanctions and import bans, including the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which restricts goods from the region. Meanwhile, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has consistently provided detailed reports on China’s economic practices and global ambitions, feeding into landmark legislation such as the CHIPS and Science Act, aimed at revitalizing domestic semiconductor manufacturing and reducing technological dependence on China.
U.S. expertise has also influenced international outcomes. In 2018, when Myanmar faced a potential debt trap from a $7.3 billion China-backed port under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), discreet advice from Western experts enabled the government to negotiate the project down to $1.3 billion – dramatically reducing exposure to Beijing’s leverage. This kind of behind-the-scenes guidance exemplifies how deeply institutionalized expertise can project strategic influence well beyond national borders.
Europe’s Fragmented Approach – and Its Costs
Despite its wealth of academic and analytical talent, Europe has long lacked structural mechanisms to embed China expertise in policymaking. Decision-makers often rely on ad hoc consultations or default to trade ministries with limited geopolitical bandwidth.
The consequences have been visible. In 2019, Italy became the sole G-7 country to join the BRI – an ill-advised move taken with minimal expert consultation and significant strategic repercussions. Promised investments never materialized, while Italy’s trade deficit with China worsened. By 2023, Rome quietly announced its intention to withdraw from the BRI, calling the original deal an “improvised and atrocious act.” Strategic misjudgments like this might have been avoided with systematic expert consultation.
Another case in point is Europe’s divided response to Huawei. While the United States and several allies moved early to restrict Huawei from their 5G networks, the EU issued a “toolbox” of recommendations – but left implementation to member states. The result was a patchwork. As of mid-2024, fewer than half of EU countries had enacted legal measures to restrict high-risk Chinese vendors like Huawei and ZTE. Germany, the EU’s largest economy, was especially slow to move. According to EUISS Senior Analyst Tim Rühlig, internal divisions and economic ties to China contributed to years of delay. This fragmentation left Europe’s 5G infrastructure vulnerable – and weakened its negotiating position with Beijing.
The problem is not a lack of talent. Institutions like the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin, Chatham House in London, and IFRI in Paris produce top-tier research. But their insights often struggle to reach the desks of those crafting policy. Without institutional channels, even the best analysis risks being sidelined.
Signs of Change: From Peripheral Insight to Policy Core
Encouragingly, Europe is beginning to close the gap – albeit slowly. In 2019, the EU’s Strategic Outlook labeled China a “systemic rival” for the first time, echoing long-standing expert warnings. That framing provided the analytical backbone for subsequent EU initiatives, including investment screening regulations and an anti-coercion instrument launched in 2023.
Germany has gone further. Its 2023 China Strategy was shaped significantly by insights from MERICS, SWP, and other influential think tanks, demonstrating a rare example of expertise directly informing policy. The document highlights “de-risking,” transparency, and strategic coordination across government – and explicitly credits external experts. Notably, MERICS had been sanctioned by Beijing in 2021 for its research on China’s human rights record – a move widely seen as validating the institute’s relevance and impact.
At the EU level, expert-informed concepts like “de-risking” are increasingly shaping discourse. In a March 2023 speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined the new approach: reducing dependencies in critical sectors while maintaining selective engagement. Three months later, the EU unveiled its Economic Security Strategy, including tools for outbound investment screening and export controls – long-standing proposals from the China policy community.
Further efforts are underway to strengthen the pipeline of expertise. The Horizon Europe–funded “China Horizons” project (2022–2025) brings together academic centers and think tanks from across Europe to provide policy-relevant research. With 4 million euros in funding, the project aims to boost “Europe’s knowledge base on contemporary China” through joint studies, training, and policy briefings.
What Europe Must Do: Three Strategic Reforms
To turn expert awareness into strategic coherence, Europe needs more than sporadic consultations or one-off strategies. Three reforms are critical: embedding China expertise in policymaking, strengthening pan-European knowledge infrastructure, and aligning language with strategy.
European governments and EU institutions should establish dedicated China units or advisory councils within key bodies: national foreign ministries, defense and security councils, the European External Action Service, and the European Commission. These units must have clear mandates, dedicated resources, and consistent access to top decision-makers, ensuring proactive strategic foresight rather than reactive crisis management. The goal is to move from ad hoc expert input to institutionalized insight. Policymakers need anticipatory analysis of China’s trajectory, not just reactive briefings in a crisis.
The U.S. National Security Council’s Asia team and the State Department’s China House offer possible templates. Europe could, for example, appoint a chief China policy coordinator (analogous to a “China czar”) to ensure that expert analysis is integrated across all relevant departments – from trade and tech to climate and security. Embedding a cadre of China specialists at the heart of EU and national governments would improve everything from investment screening decisions to diplomatic strategy.
The EU should also invest in a more coordinated intra-European network for China research and intelligence-sharing. The existing European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), which links institutes across the continent, is a good starting point but remains an informal collaboration. Brussels could elevate this into a structured, well-funded China knowledge hub that produces joint assessments and policy memos for EU and member-state officials. A permanent “China analysis unit” in Brussels – drawing on ETNC members, Horizon Europe projects like China Horizons, and national research centers – could pool expertise and provide real-time advice to all 27 EU countries. This would be especially valuable for smaller states that lack in-house China analysts. By comparing risk assessments and coordinating perspectives, Europe can avoid being divided and played off against itself. In practical terms, the EU might fund regular joint studies (for instance, on Chinese economic coercion tactics or tech standards strategy) and create secure channels for sharing sensitive findings among governments. Think of it as Europe’s collective brain trust on China.
Finally, Europe must align its rhetoric with its strategy. European leaders have begun to adopt more strategic language – but too often, it still downplays the risks at hand. The term “de-risking” has been a useful and more palatable alternative to “decoupling,” yet too much euphemism can obscure intent. By contrast, U.S. officials now speak relatively plainly of selective decoupling, supply chain security, and even Taiwan contingency planning. While Europe need not copy Washington’s rhetoric verbatim, it must adopt language that clarifies rather than obscures strategic intentions. Calling China a “partner” or “competitor” is fine for nuance, but not if it blunts recognition of systemic rivalry.
Clear, evidence-based language is essential both for internal clarity and external signaling. EU leaders should forthrightly communicate what “de-risking” entails – e.g. screening Chinese investments in strategic sectors, curbing exports of dual-use technology, defending academic freedoms, and preparing for possible Chinese aggression in Asia. Where European interests diverge from Beijing’s, officials should say so unambiguously. Precision and candor in public statements will help prepare European publics for tougher measures, reassure allies that Europe is realistic, and let China’s leadership know that divide-and-rule tactics won’t easily find fertile ground.
Strategic Autonomy Begins With Expertise
In an era of systemic rivalry and rapid geopolitical change, Europe’s ability to act coherently on the China challenge will depend on whether it can systematically integrate expertise into policy. The talent is there – Europe boasts many of the world’s leading China scholars and analysts, and many European diplomats are themselves savvy on China. The challenge lies in building pathways that connect expertise to power. That means embedding China specialists into real-time decision processes, linking national research centers into a continental knowledge network, and ensuring leaders are briefed by people who read Chinese-language sources (and Xi’s speeches) long before they read the latest news headlines.
The United States moved early to harness its China experts as architects of policy, and is reaping the benefits of foresight and agility. Europe must now catch up. A more strategic Europe would leverage its rich knowledge base to avoid naïve entanglements (like Italy’s ill-fated BRI foray), to harden its vulnerabilities (from 5G networks to supply chains), and to speak with a more unified voice when Beijing attempts to intimidate or coerce one of its members. All of that requires the infrastructure of expertise: dedicated units, funding, information-sharing, and political will to listen to the specialists.
The window for Europe’s strategic awakening on China is open, but it will not stay open indefinitely. As Beijing continues to expand its global reach and sharpen its tactics, a reactive or fragmented Europe will find its interests undermined one by one. By contrast, a Europe that is informed, proactive, and collectively self-assured can better defend its values and autonomy.
Ultimately, strategic autonomy is not merely about possessing industrial strength or military assets; it fundamentally depends on having the independent analytical capacity to understand, anticipate, and decisively respond to your most pressing external challenges. Closing the China expertise gap is thus not a technocratic sidebar; it is central to Europe’s security and sovereignty in the 21st century. The time to act is now, before today’s strategic blind spot turns into tomorrow’s strategic failure.