Since taking power, China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping has made purges under the anti-corruption pretext a hallmark of his tenure. As the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi executed similar purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), first targeting officers from rival factions before turning on military leaders that he had promoted himself. The second round of the PLA anti-corruption campaign, launched in 2023, has destabilized the military’s high command, leading to the downfall of several sitting CMC members.
Defense Minister and CMC member Li Shangfu was the first to fall, disappearing after August 2023. His case was referred for criminal prosecution in June 2024, but there has been no news regarding the verdict. In November 2024, the Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua also fell from grace. Then, in April 2025, the Financial Times reported that CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong had been removed from power, making him the first incumbent CMC vice chairman to be purged since 1967. He has not appeared in public since.
These atypical removals have reduced CMC membership from seven to four. As China’s supreme defense decision-making organ, the CMC is responsible for managing some three million PLA personnel and 500,000 People’s Armed Police. The downsizing of the CMC under extraordinary circumstances is bound to have profound consequences for the PLA’s ability to function as a modern warfighting organization.
The CMC as the Brain of the PLA
The CMC is an organ of the Chinese Communist Party. Following the principle of “the party directs the gun,” orders from the CMC shape decisions on all military matters – such as C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems, officer promotions, war plans development, reform initiatives, research and development programs, procurement, military diplomacy, and reassuring the CCP’s control over the armed forces.
At the core of the CMC are its chairman, vice chairmen, and other members who meet regularly to deliberate on important national defense issues. At its peak in the 1960s, the CMC had over a dozen standing members, a number that decreased during the Deng Xiaoping era following military personnel reduction measures. In the reform era, CMC membership was standardized to include the directors of the four general departments and heads of PLA services.
However, these norms were disrupted after Xi came to power and launched a series of purges. In his first term as CMC chairman, Xi ousted two sitting CMC members from rival factions. In his second term, beginning in 2017, Xi downsized the CMC and appointed members primarily based on political loyalty rather than institutional representation. Xi’s third term saw even further CMC contractions, with continuous purges reducing its active membership to just four.
Remaining Members: The Boss, The Pros, and the Watchdog
As a result, the aptitude and experience of the remaining members will directly influence the CMC’s performance. Xi, the CMC chairman, does not have a wealth of military experiences. He served in the PLA for almost three years as a secretary to then-Defense Minister Geng Biao. During this period, Xi shadowed Geng but he did not accumulate firsthand experience as a military commander.
CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, who manages everyday PLA affairs on Xi’s behalf, does possess combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese War. A childhood acquaintance of Xi, Zhang joined the PLA in 1968 and participated in operations against Vietnam in 1979 as a company commander. In the 1980s, Zhang led a regiment in border clashes between China and Vietnam. Honored as a brave commander, Zhang’s subsequent career progression benefitted from his battlefield experience, Red Princeling background, and friendship with Xi.
General Liu Zhenli, who heads the Joint Staff Department, is the second professional officer on the CMC. Like Zhang Youxia, Liu participated in military operations along the China-Vietnam border in the 1980s and earned a first-class combat merit medal. Later, he commanded various military units before becoming the People’s Armed Police’s chief-of-staff, afterwards serving as the commander of the Army.
Rocket Force General Zhang Shengmin is the only non-Army officer currently on the CMC. He is the secretary of the CMC Disciplinary Inspection Commission, the PLA’s anti-corruption watchdog agency and an enforcer of Xi’s control over the military. A career political commissar, Zhang is well-suited for internal oversight. Like Xi, he has limited operational and combat experience.
Given the current CMC composition, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are likely to offer the most valuable military input. However, the tense atmosphere of fear and conformity, conditioned by the recent purges, certainly gives Xi the strongest voice in defense affairs, despite lacking a strong military résumé. Xi’s directives override all others and professional officers are unlikely to challenge him. This dynamic has concrete ramifications for the CMC’s function as the supreme national defense decision-making body.
Implications for Peace and War
In recent years, decision-making within the PLA at the highest levels has become increasingly centralized. However, a shrinking circle of CMC leaders means heavier responsibility falling on each individual member. Presiding over the smallest CMC since 1949 is Xi, whose assertiveness and willingness to purge underlings have solidified his dominance of Commission meetings. Xi’s opinions are unlikely to be questioned, creating a lack of intellectual diversity and fostering a potential echo chamber. The current CMC is effectively reliant on the thinking of one man, who notably lacks formal military expertise. Nonetheless, the presence of combat-tested professionals such as Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli could significantly aid Xi’s decision-making – although their positions remain precarious in an environment overshadowed by abrupt purges.
Xi’s apparent lack of urgency in replacing purged CMC members suggests that he is comfortable with the current CMC set up of a small circle of confidants. Actually, in peacetime, this configuration benefits Xi, who seeks concentrated power. A closed group is easier to manage. Without the pressures of war, a small CMC can still manage PLA affairs without major obstacles.
However, in the event of war, this compact leadership structure may prove inadequate in handling the demands of a high-intensity conflict. Then, Xi would face a dilemma of whether to delegate more power to military professionals and invite them on to the CMC roster, or continue to rely on a tight circle of loyal advisors to prosecute the war – an approach that would likely constrain the PLA’s effectiveness.
In essence, a diminished and shrunken CMC – especially one weakened by purges – risks compromising PLA decision-making capacity, particularly in wartime. Furthermore, the true extent of the purges within CMC-controlled organs remains opaque. But it is almost guaranteed that the fall of a departmental director, such as the CMC Political Work Department’s Miao Hua, likely leads to further housecleaning of his subordinates, meaning the scope of disruption could be broader than previously thought. While Xi may find comfort operating within a close-knit group of loyalists, the repercussions of a hollowed-out CMC could significantly impair the PLA’s warfighting capabilities.