When Chinese and Russian officials meet beneath the banners of “no limits” cooperation, it is easy to focus on the pageantry: bilateral summits, choreographed handshakes and scripted joint declarations. Beneath this diplomatic theater, however, lies a more subtle and resilient connection – one forged not solely in elite dialogues, but in the minds of everyday Chinese citizens. It is a bond sustained less by ideology and more by the quiet mechanics of perception.
The latest data from the Chinese Citizens’ Global Perception Survey (CCGPS) confirms that in 2025, Russia remains the most trusted global partner for mainland Chinese respondents. Forty-two percent assigned Russia the lowest possible adversarial rating on the survey’s 7-point Likert scale. Although Russia’s perceived importance to China’s long-term future dipped marginally, down 3 percent year-over-year, it still outpaces sentiment toward other jurisdictions, including the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Remarkably, this trust endures even as Russia remains embroiled in its war with Ukraine and continues to face international condemnation.
Understanding this enduring sentiment requires unpacking the foundations of public knowledge. The survey consistently finds a strong statistical correlation between trust in Russia and reported “knowledge of Russia.” In both 2024 and 2025, this variable overshadowed all others in explanatory power.
Yet this knowledge is shaped less by personal experience and more by a curated media ecosystem. Television remains the dominant channel informing Chinese views of global affairs. In 2025, exposure to TV showed a highly significant positive correlation with trust in Russia (p = 0.001); such a low p-value, far below the conventional 0.05 threshold, indicates that the relationship is highly unlikely to be due to chance. In China, a steady stream of state-managed broadcasts portrays Russia as a constructive and dependable partner, particularly in coverage of events such as Belt and Road summits and meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These portrayals frame Russia as a stabilizing presence, a counterweight to Western pressure, and a participant in a harmonious Eurasian order.
Other media channels have less consistent effects. Newspapers appear largely neutral. Radio even showed a dampening impact in the 2024 survey (p = 0.003), suggesting tone or format may influence how Russian narratives are received. Meanwhile, social media platforms provided supplemental reinforcement, but their influence pales in comparison to television’s reach.
What stands out most, however, is the role of interpersonal dialogue. Unlike centralized media narratives, conversations among friends and family introduce organic skepticism. In 2025, interpersonal discussion had a statistically significant negative association with trust in Russia (p = 0.018). This suggests that grassroots conversation can subtly disrupt curated messaging. In tightly controlled media environments, where messaging is broadcast top-down, peer-to-peer discourse becomes a site for dissent; not necessarily overt, but divergent enough to matter.
Notably, demographic and ideological variables, often reliable predictors of public attitudes, proved inconsequential. Age, gender, income and Communist Party of China membership showed no consistent effect. Even education exerted minimal influence, though bachelor’s degree holders demonstrated a modest increase in trust toward Russia in 2025 (p = 0.055). What this reveals is striking: pro-Russian sentiment is not rooted in sociopolitical identifiers, but in the sheer frequency and tone of media exposure. Trust, in this context, becomes a product of repetition and resonance.
Layered over these media-driven dynamics is a sense of geopolitical positioning. Most respondents viewed China as the world’s leading power, with 72 percent in 2025 awarding it the highest score on global influence. The United States followed closely, but Russia ranked much lower, with only 26 percent assigning it top-tier status. This perceived power disparity does not diminish Russia’s trust rating. Instead, it suggests a strategic asymmetry: Chinese citizens see Russia not as an equal superpower, but as a loyal adjunct, an ally that reinforces China’s global posture without challenging it.
One possible explanation lies in what might be termed preference elasticity. Within controlled media landscapes, public attitudes can shift depending on how issues are framed. Russian actions abroad may be contentious internationally, but domestic narratives in China often emphasize common strategic interests: resistance to Western hegemony, coordination on security issues, and mutual investments in regional frameworks. Television’s outsized role in shaping these narratives ensures that trust in Russia reflects not independent judgment, but consensus cultivated through storytelling.
This phenomenon carries implications far beyond bilateral relations. As China’s global posture evolves from economic ascendancy to strategic leadership, the management of its public perception toward favored partners becomes central to its soft power toolkit. Russia, in this configuration, serves not as a model or mentor, but as a dependable auxiliary. It is a nation that validates China’s multipolar vision while absorbing Western rebuke. The muted public response to the war in Ukraine underscores the difference in accountability mechanisms: while citizens in liberal democracies may protest or push back against foreign policy choices, sentiment in authoritarian systems can remain insulated, shaped more by curated narratives than normative critique.
Importantly, this narrative control affects China’s approach to the broader Indo-Pacific. The region is a patchwork of strategic alignments, contested borders, and shifting coalitions. In this context, China’s ability to maintain favorable domestic sentiment toward its strategic partners, particularly when those partners are controversial internationally, grants it added flexibility. The China-Russia alignment, sustained by internal legitimacy, allows Beijing to assert influence from Central Asia to the South China Sea without overt ideological entanglements. For states navigating Sino-American competition, the perception of China as possessing steady and loyal allies may tilt diplomatic calculations, potentially encouraging bandwagoning or hedging rather than balancing.
At the same time, the elasticity of Chinese public opinion raises questions about the stability of such partnerships. If China were to recalibrate its messaging – whether to accommodate diplomatic shifts or to respond to domestic pressures – the public’s trust in Russia could change swiftly. In this sense, the alliance is durable only so long as its narrative remains unchallenged.
And in a highly regulated media sphere, that narrative is never fixed, it is often engineered.
For Moscow, China’s popular trust offers more than diplomatic cover; it provides psychological reassurance and strategic relevance. Facing sanctions and isolation in much of the West, Russia finds in China not only a market and geopolitical partner, but also a population that views it favorably. That goodwill, however mediated, bolsters cooperation across military, energy and technology sectors. However, it ties Russia’s image to the whims of Beijing’s narrative framing; a vulnerability masked by current alignment, but real nonetheless.
In the end, China’s closeness with Russia illustrates how foreign relations can be shaped by perception more than policy. Through television-driven narratives, adaptable public preferences, and neutralized ideological cues, Russian trust among Chinese citizens becomes both an outcome and a tool of statecraft. Within this system, trust is not a verdict; it is a projection. It reflects less what Russia is and more what China needs it to be. As Beijing navigates the future of regional order in the Indo-Pacific, that kind of projection could be its most versatile asset.