Amid an increasingly tumultuous time of escalating global nuclear tensions, a quiet but potentially significant development emerged in the Southeast Asia region. During the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference with China, Beijing reportedly declared its commitment to sign the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty “without reservation.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed this, expressing China’s willingness “to be the first” in signing the treaty. Russia is expected to sign as well, according to Malaysia’s foreign minister.
Beijing’s longstanding support for the SEANWFZ has been consistent and welcomed by the region and proponents of disarmament. What is more surprising – and arguably more consequential – is that the United States is reportedly reviewing and considering the treaty. This consideration, after years of giving the SEANWFZ a cold shoulder, reflects an unexpected alignment with China and Russia – a rare potential point of convergence between the three nuclear powers on nuclear restraint in the region.
This development marks a major turn for the SEANWFZ. Also known as the Treaty of Bangkok, it aims to prohibit the development, stationing, or testing of nuclear weapons in the territories of ASEAN member states. A related protocol within this treaty calls for the five nuclear-weapon states – France, the U.S., the U.K., Russia, and China – to not use or deploy nuclear weapons in the zone. Yet three decades since the treaty’s signing by ASEAN states in 1995, none of the nuclear weapons states has signed the protocol.
This persistent impasse doesn’t stem from outright rejection of the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone, given that several nuclear weapon states have signed on to similar initiatives in Central Asia as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, the reluctance to sign on to the protocol is in large part due to the interpretive uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the articles of SEANWFZ.
Take the issue of transporting nuclear weapons through the region, for example. While Article 3(1)(b) required signatory states to not “station, or transport nuclear weapons by any means,” Article 7 indicated that it is the prerogative of each state to allow foreign vessels entry or passage through its territorial waters. In both cases, the treaty lacks explicit clauses involving the transit of nuclear weapons by a third-party nation. The ambiguity in terms of strategic assets transiting through the zone could contradict and undermine longstanding commitments to freedom of navigation. While there have been revised protocols brokered between nuclear weapon states and ASEAN to narrow the divide and outline steps toward eventual agreement, disagreements still persist over the vague geographical extent of the treaty and its related transit provisions.
From this view, the current convergence on support for the SEANWFZ, however nascent or fragile, offers a valuable and rare opening to reinvigorate stalled and acrimonious strategic relations between the world’s top nuclear powers. This can be done by seizing this opportunity in shifting the focus of the dialogue. Rather than debating the merits of the treaty, China, Russia, the United States, and ASEAN can redirect efforts and engage in substantive and productive dialogues to clarify the meaning, scope, and mechanisms underpinning the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
Specifically, to capitalize on this alignment and move the SEANWFZ from a mere concept to actuality, ASEAN should take a more proactive role in convening and leading discussions. Whether in initiating dialogues or establishing multilateral working groups involving the nuclear weapons states, ASEAN’s role is imperative in this regard for two reasons. First, it would not only assert the bloc’s relevance and leadership – a key feature of ASEAN Centrality – but it could also demonstrate ASEAN’s maturity and showcase its capacity for leadership in complex strategic affairs. Second, ASEAN’s involvement as an honest broker could also steer the conversation away from geopolitical impasse and toward practical and meaningful dialogues among the participants.
Importantly, the goal of discussions and dialogue should not be the immediate ratification of the SEANWFZ by the nuclear weapons states. On the contrary, the focus should be centered on the process that will lead to the ratification. The process of establishing a joint understanding and establishing clarity in the Southeast Asian version of a nuclear weapons-free zone would, by extension, include discussions regarding setting the boundaries of the zone, clarifying the permissibility of transit of nuclear weapons – and if so, what type, under what conditions, and how would it be verified – as well as clarifying issues surrounding stationing of strategic assets. Such dialogue could serve as a low-hanging confidence-building measure that could kickstart strategic dialogues. At the same time, it offers a rare on-ramp to China-U.S. or Russia-U.S. strategic engagement, potentially laying the groundwork for future trilateral discussions and cooperation.
In an era of great power rivalry, where formal strategic dialogues have become increasingly hard to come by, dialogues surrounding the technical and legal aspects of ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zone offer an invaluable opportunity to develop common points and establish shared understandings. Despite being narrow in scope, it is high in potential as joint technical and legal discussions and consultations on the SEANWFZ can lay the foundation for broader strategic dialogues, particularly at a time of frayed relations. Viewed this way, even if clarifying the terms and meanings of the SEANWFZ will not resolve great power tension, it offers a rare, realistic step forward, while affirming ASEAN’s central role in Southeast Asian affairs and creating a pathway for renewed great power strategic dialogue.