Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong recently remarked in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, that Australia seeks “a region in which no country dominates, and no country is dominated.” It is a carefully crafted formulation that is intended to resonate with ASEAN’s long-standing practice of strategic modesty and non-alignment. The comment followed Wong’s return for a second term as foreign minister after having visited every Pacific Islands Forum member and all of the ASEAN countries other than Myanmar. It reflects the strategic importance of both regions within Australia’s foreign policy frame.
Yet there is a difference in how Australia actions its strategic ambitions in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific. Australia is acutely aware that it does not hold the same level of influence or capacity to project power in Southeast Asia as it does in the Pacific. As a result, it adopts a more conciliatory posture by presenting itself as a partner in pursuit of shared goals like peace and stability, and emphasizing mutual respect, economic integration, and multilateral cooperation.
In the Pacific, Australia’s actions increasingly reflect the role of strategic protector. From a host of bilateral security agreements such as 2024 security agreement with Papua New Guinea to Tuvalu’s 2023 climate-security deal, Australia’s presence is increasingly proactive and pre-emptive. Canberra views the Pacific as both a responsibility, and a zone to be safeguarded, particularly in response to China’s growing influence. The region itself is often portrayed as strategically exposed and historically entangled in aid and defense relationships.
However, Australia’s Pacific engagement is not uniform. Its relationships with the Melanesian states differ markedly from its posture in Micronesia, where the United States holds strategic primacy. New Zealand meanwhile maintains influence over its associates and historically, the Polynesian states. These differences reflect the region’s layered colonial histories, differing national priorities and varying levels of receptivity to external powers.
Given the Pacific’s geographical vastness and complex political landscape, there is an unspoken understanding between these traditional powers that each will continue to maintain influence in their own areas of strategic familiarity. This arrangement does not render their involvement illegitimate, but it does make their role uneven and difficult to separate from deeper historical patterns of control. It also reveals how the vulnerabilities and choices of Pacific states continue to shape the behavior of larger powers.
And it is this reality – partnership in ASEAN and strategic dominance in the Pacific – that exposes an often-overlooked opportunity: the potential for Pacific and Southeast Asian states to forge closer alignment and to maximize their collective leverage.
Geographically, both regions sit at the strategic crossroads of the Indo-Pacific region. The Pacific holds vast ocean resources, critical mineral reserve, carbon sinks, and sea lanes that are vital to global supply chains and climate goals. ASEAN meanwhile, offers a dynamic market, industrial capacity, and a large labor force, all of which position it as a key engine of regional economic growth. Together the Pacific and Southeast Asia represent complementary strengths – resource-rich, demographically strong, and strategically positioned.
Both regions also share a strong tradition of non-alignment, climate diplomacy, and an aversion to great-power binaries. They prefer consensus over coercion, and a preference for relationships over denial and dominance. Their instincts are cautious but not passive. Increasingly, their interests on fisheries, development, security, and even digital governance are overlapping.
Yet the institutional and diplomatic ties between Pacific states and ASEAN remain thin. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has signed an arrangement with ASEAN in 2023, but it is largely symbolic at this stage. The underdevelopment of South-South cooperation – especially among those who are actively working to avoid great power alignment – represents a missed strategic opportunity.
For the Pacific, the reasons are familiar. First, limited capacity has long constrained regional engagement let alone south-south cooperation. Second, there is still a lack of appreciation for the strategic value that Southeast Asia holds – both as partner and as a geopolitical space. As a result, there remains a default reliance on traditional partners (and China) as the first port of call. The challenge, however, is that their interests do not always align with Pacific states and this reliance can obscure alternative opportunities that are less about aid and more about aligned foreign policy and mutual strategic leverage.
Like the PIF, ASEAN operates by consensus, which often limits its ability to respond swiftly or take unified positions on contentious issues. Its principle of non-interference and lack of strong enforcement mechanisms can constraint deeper cooperation or collective action, particularly in matters of security or external alignment. Ironically, this suggests the benefits of exploring other arrangements outside of both ASEAN and the PIF – including via subregional and bilateral channels. ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore offer promising entry points for climate, trade and diplomatic collaboration.
This is not to suggest that Australia should step back. Far from it. Australia remains a critical development partner and ally. But its dual role as both protector and participant means it cannot be the only bridge between the Pacific and Asia. A triangle cannot rest securely on one leg.
New Zealand too has shown similar tendencies – as seen in its freezing of aid to the Cook Islands following its strategic partnership agreement with China. This reveals how a “family first” partner can react to limit Pacific choices that are not perceived to be in the interest of New Zealand.
If Pacific regionalism is ever to exercise “real” agency within geopolitics, it must extend its horizon and deepen its ties with Southeast Asia. Penny Wong’s diplomacy may be sincere and skilled, but in the end – as in all foreign policy – it is the structure more than the sentiment that shapes the outcomes.