When the National Citizen Party (NCP) officially launched on February 28, many questioned whether the party, which was founded by the youth who led the July 2024 uprising, could extend their support base beyond urban areas to resonate with Bangladesh’s rural majority. This is because although the uprising stirred emotions across the country, its core strength was city-centered, casting doubt on the party’s ability to generate genuine grassroots momentum.
Confronting those doubts head-on, the NCP recently initiated a month-long campaign titled “Desh Gorte July Podojatra” (July March to Build the Nation), covering all 64 districts of Bangladesh. Since July 1, party members have been travelling from small towns to villages, engaging with local communities, honoring families who had a child or relative killed during the uprising, and promoting their vision of a “Second Republic” that is rooted in justice, equality, and a new democratic constitution.
This countrywide march is a rare phenomenon in the history of Bangladesh’s politics. Rather than relying only on patronage, rallies, or elections as other parties do, the NCP is building support through outreach and direct engagement like talking to families who lost their loved ones due to violence, hearing all perspectives, and working toward establishing trust gradually.
In the post-1990 democratic era, this kind of political activity has been rare. Except for a few instances, most new parties have emerged by elite fragmentation and not by popular revolts, and barely conduct mass mobilization beyond elections. Against this backdrop, NCP’s mass-level campaign can be seen as an effort to modify the political landscape of Bangladesh from the grassroot level.
The necessity for such political outreach was evident from the beginning. According to the United Nations, the July 2024 uprising resulted in more than 1,400 deaths, injury to thousands, and arrests across the country. While protest epicenters were in major cities like Dhaka, Rajshahi, and Chittagong, and other districts and towns, many victims hailed from rural and small towns. That human cost — paired with decades of exclusion from meaningful democratic participation — created fertile ground for a party like the NCP to gain moral legitimacy, if not immediate electoral strength.
Across the border, in India, Rahul Gandhi’s Bharat Jodo Yatra in 2022–2023 helped the Congress Party to attempt to humanize a movement, rebuild trust in public leadership, and create emotional continuity between people and policy. While Gandhi’s march didn’t result in a victory in national elections in 2024, it helped rehabilitate his image and reconnect his party with the people, which contributed to the party’s improved performance in elections. Similarly, the NCP’s effort, centered on empathy, storytelling, and symbolic presence, could help the party define itself outside of traditional dynastic politics or Islamist narratives that dominate mainstream discourse in Bangladesh.
Although the NCP is unlikely to be seen as an immediate electoral rival of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) or Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), its campaign may succeed in building something those parties have recently struggled with: moral energy and youth engagement. In an electorate where the majority of voters are young, but political loyalties are shaped by decades-old battles, the NCP’s rhetoric of reform, justice, and inclusive governance resonates with a generation that has grown disillusioned with both the ruling and opposition forces. Rather than replacing these parties outright, the NCP is trying to create a third space.
From the very beginning, and especially during the ongoing campaign, it has become clear that the NCP is placing strong emphasis on region-based political strategies. One striking example is how the party has divided the country into two zones: the Northern Region and the Southern Region. This division reflects their tailored messaging and priorities for each area. This regional approach is also reflected in their social media campaigns, where posts and narratives are often customized according to local issues and sentiments.
However, the campaign has not been free from challenges and controversies. On July 16, when the NCP was attending a rally at Gopalganj, Sheikh Hasina’s home district, violence broke out when Awami League activists attacked NCP leaders and police personnel, leading to a confrontation. At least four people were killed, dozens injured, and a curfew was imposed on the entire district for the next few days.
Moreover, the four deceased were buried without autopsy, which is raising serious questions about the transparency of the current interim government.
Smaller-scale clashes also occurred in other parts of the country, where tensions between NCP activists and local political opponents — and sometimes even within NCP ranks — exploded violently. Some have blamed the violence on AL remnants, while others point to security lapses. What is clear is that the situation was so dire that the NCP leadership had to be rescued from Gopalganj in a military armored vehicle.
In his speeches, NCP convener Nahid Islam has sharply criticized the BNP, highlighting a deepening divide between the two political forces. Speaking at a street rally in Patuakhali on July 14, Nahid labeled the BNP a “party of extortionists and criminals” and accused it of becoming the “new guardian of Mujibism,” a reference to the AL’s ideology. He charged the BNP with shielding corrupt interests and defending the 1972 Constitution, which aligns with the AL’s ideological framework.
In contrast, the NCP’s tone toward JI and other Islamist groups was notably soft. Moreover, on July 19, NCP leaders shared the stage with JI and delivered speeches during a mass gathering organized by JI in the capital.
Despite the NCP’s efforts to mobilize at the grassroots level, these may not be enough. Political marches or rallies, while energizing, must be backed by lasting political infrastructure. Unless the NCP can convert its momentum into concrete platforms — such as clear policy proposals, membership expansion, coalition-building, and a presence in grassroots elections — it risks remaining a youth-led movement rather than evolving into a lasting political force. Already, student unions and youth organizations have criticized both the NCP and the interim government for failing to deliver tangible progress on issues like employment, education, and minority rights. Meanwhile, civic groups are raising concerns over potential violence, increasing crime rate and violence against women, warning that the ideals of the July uprising are increasingly being commemorated rather than implemented.
Still, in many ways, the march has already succeeded in changing the political conversation. Whether the party can win over rural voters remains uncertain — but their approach is a bold shift in Bangladeshi politics. By stepping beyond city centers and engaging directly with marginalized communities, they’ve shown a commitment to inclusive politics. Still, in a deeply polarized landscape, rural trust won’t come easily.