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The Iran-Israel War’s Geopolitical Implications for South Asia

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The Iran-Israel War’s Geopolitical Implications for South Asia

India would be at a significant geopolitical disadvantage if the U.S is preoccupied with the Middle East, causing it to deemphasize Asia and its relationship with New Delhi.

The Iran-Israel War’s Geopolitical Implications for South Asia

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine conduct a press briefing after the United States strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, June 22, 2025.

Credit: U.S. Department of Defense

On June 13, Israel launched air strikes on nuclear, military, and civilian sites in Iran. Top Iranian military officials and nuclear scientists were assassinated in the targeted strikes. Days later, the United States bombed three nuclear facilities in Iran, after which Israel and Iran agreed to a ceasefire. Despite heavy Iranian losses, Iran’s regime and nuclear program have survived.

The Iran-Israel war will have major geopolitical reverberations that will be felt for years throughout the world, including South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan — both of which have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan are South Asia’s two most important powers, with strategic ties with both the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific regions.

Strength Matters

A key lesson of the Iran-Israel war is that strength matters: technology, drones, the ability to gain air superiority, and of course, nuclear weapons. There is no substitute for weaponry. Countries around the world can likely expect a less secure, and more nuclear future, as airstrikes become increasingly normalized. It is illuminating that Iran, which lacked a nuclear deterrent, has been bombed, but North Korea, which has one, has not.

In this respect, both India and Pakistan are ahead of the game by already possessing nuclear weapons, likely limiting the options of hostile powers seeking to attack either country. Moreover, the United States and other major powers have essentially acquiesced to India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, demonstrating the advantage of building a bomb and waiting out the consequences.

The recent bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025 was relatively self-contained, perhaps because of the nuclear deterrent. Both countries also possessed air defense capabilities that frustrated the plans of their enemies.

Powerful Friends

The strength of a country and its ability to weather a conflict is also contingent on who its friends are, and what technology it has access to. Despite a movement toward a multipolar world order, the Iran-Israel war, like the conflict in Ukraine, demonstrates the advantage of friendship with the West, and the United States above all, because of the military, diplomatic, and technological benefits that accrue. Israel and Ukraine have been able to gain an advantage over larger, ostensibly powerful adversaries for this reason.

The advantages of this lesson can be seen in practice in the case of Pakistan. Pakistan and Iran have engaged in similar behavior: they have both threatened their neighbors and supported proxy groups that have engaged in terrorism, while using their conventional weapons programs as shields. However, Pakistan does not engage in revisionist rhetoric or seek to oppose the West. More importantly, it continued to engage with the U.S. and seek its diplomatic support, a strategy that paid off in its favor during the recent conflict with India. U.S. President Donald Trump’s claim of mediating an end to that conflict was well-received in Pakistan and met with skepticism in India. China’s friendship toward Pakistan was equally pivotal — a Chinese diplomat once referred to Pakistan as “our Israel.” Chinese material support helped sustain Pakistan’s defense during its conflict with India.

Despite deepening ties between India and the U.S. and a shared strategic imperative to counter China, New Delhi has not been able to leverage its relationship with Washington in pursuit of its foreign policy. The lessons of the Iran-Israel war support this: the United States’ enthusiastic support of Israel’s campaign in Iran contrasts with its more balanced position toward India. In the latest conflict, Israel proved the advantage of having a close and powerful friend and Iran suffered the disadvantage of being friendless. While the U.S. extends almost unconditional support toward Israel, and China and Pakistan share an “all-weather” friendship, it is unclear if any other country supports India to such an extent — certainly not Russia, which could barely do anything for Iran.

French political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot argued recently that India’s tradition of multilateral diplomacy has also diluted its relationships and asked who India could depend on to be its “all-weather” friend, especially if neither the United States nor Russia could play such a role. The solution is that India has to take a page from Israel’s book and pursue closer alliances if it wants the firm support from the United States that it sought, but did not receive, when it engaged in its own bombing campaign against Pakistan. The emphasis should be more on cultivating chumminess with friends rather than isolating in Pakistan. India recently opposed a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) statement condemning the Israeli attack on Iran, locating it firmly against the policies of the informal alliance of China, Iran, and Russia. India has already drawn closer to the United States, Israel, and by implication, other states closely aligned with the West, so it should build on this.

Managing the U.S. Pivot to Asia

The question of Indian friendship with the United States is closely related to the state of the U.S. pivot to Asia. The pivot, always at the cusp of happening, never seems to quite materialize because of commitments in the Middle East or elsewhere. At a time when the material, technological, and diplomatic benefits of drawing closer to the United States should be evident for India, New Delhi should not draw the wrong lessons because of improving Pakistan-U.S. relations. More dangerously, India should worry about the United States being distracted by the Middle East, because it would be less committed to Asian geopolitics, and a key rationale for blooming India-U.S. ties is a shared desire to balance against China.

While weakening Russia and Iran could dilute some of China’s geopolitical strength, an overstretched or increasingly risk-averse United States could well let China become the dominant power in the Western Pacific. American energy is largely directed toward Europe and the Middle East to the detriment of the Indo-Pacific, and its involvement in the latest Iran-Israel war reinforces this. Many Asian countries, including U.S. allies South Korea and Japan would like to avoid a regional war with China over Taiwan, and most Southeast Asian countries are increasingly leaning toward China, according to a recent survey.

Thus, India would be placed at a significant geopolitical disadvantage if U.S. commitments to other parts of the world cause it to deemphasize Asia, including its relationship with India. This further drives home the need for India to have firm friends and deemphasize enmities in order to avoid strategic loneliness.