It was a cold night on February 28 at Patenga beach in Chittagong, the port city of Bangladesh, when Sub-Inspector Yusuf Ali, who had recently transferred from the River Police, noticed some young men smoking cannabis, which is illegal in Bangladesh. Yusuf warned them and let them go after they apologized. But the young men soon came back with more people. They grabbed Yusuf by his collar, tore his uniform, tied him up, and beat him badly. A video of the beating showed Yusuf crying and saying he is a police officer; however the mob ignored it and called him “fake” police. The incident went viral on social media.
A week later, on the night of March 6-7, another event occurred at Dhaka’s Shahbagh Police Station. A group of Islamist men attempted to storm the station and free a suspect who had been arrested for allegedly harassing a female student at the University of Dhaka.
Not long after that, on March 18 in the capital’s Khilkhet area, another group of police officers was attacked by a mob when they tried to arrest a teenager accused of rape. The angry crowd took away the suspect and badly injured him, along with seven officers. They also damaged a police van.
These incidents are not isolated; rather they show that police personnel still face great dangers and challenges while doing their jobs a full 10 months after the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the police agency’s collapse. During the month-long student led uprisings that led to Hasina’s flight, some 1,400 people were killed by the law enforcement agencies, especially the police force, and agents affiliated with Hasina’s Awami League.
The authorities reported that 44 police personnel were killed by demonstrators during the protests, including 24 who were murdered on August 5, 2024, the day Hasina fled the country. The protesters sought revenge against the police, whom were labeled perpetrators of “genocide.” Mobs attacked police stations, and the force went on strike for their own safety.
In the end, the Bangladesh Army had to leave its barracks in order to control the situation.
A Police Reform Commission was established by the interim government on October 3. Led by former Secretary Safar Raj Hossain, the commission submitted its report to Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus on January 15 of this year . It recommended a five-step use-of-force plan based on old and British colonial laws and modern international standards, which was intended to minimize harm and protect lives.
The Police Reform Commission also urged quick implementation of Supreme Court directives on arrests, searches, and interrogations. Suggestions included amending laws, installing glass-walled interrogation rooms, treating female detainees with more respect, and banning the filing of cases against unknown persons and showing suspects to the media before conviction.
The report also called for empowering the National Human Rights Commission to directly investigate abuses by law enforcement and proposed a review of the Rapid Action Battalion’s role, especially in light of the violence against students and civilians during the protests of July and August 2024.
Moreover, to build a transparent, people-friendly police system, the reform commission advised making the proposed police commission an independent body. It recommended specialized, non-transferable investigation teams, removing political bias in police verification, and forming local all-party watchdog committees to prevent corruption.
Other proposals included fair recruitment and promotion policies to address the reality that more than half of Bangladesh’s field-level police officers were recruited during Hasina’s 15-year tenure, with 105,925 constables and 11,500 sub-inspectors appointed between 2009 and 2023. For top posts like superintendent of police and officer in charge, a fitness-based list was suggested, while yearly promotion tests for lower ranks could be reduced. The reform commission emphasized the need for more women officers and recommended stress relief efforts, better housing, and mandatory leave to improve the lives of police officers.
Community engagement efforts like safety committees and campaigns such as “Be a Policeman for a Day” were also encouraged. The commission also recommended that a magistrate be required for house searches at night.
However, the Police Reform Commission faced criticism from various quarters. Experts, civil society members, and even police personnel expressed concerns over certain recommendations and omissions in the report. Notably, there was discontent within the police force regarding the proposal to establish an independent police commission, which was seen as a move to reduce political interference in police operations. Additionally, the National Consensus Commission, which was tasked with reviewing and implementing various reform proposals, notably excluded the recommendations of the Police Reform Commission from its structured framework. This omission led to further dissatisfaction among stakeholders.
Field-level police officers also expressed disappointment over the Commission’s recommendations, saying that they ignored key issues like protection from unlawful orders and the slow pace of promotions. Many blamed the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) system, which gives superiors too much control and is often used unfairly without accountability. Officers say they handle most investigations but senior officials interfere and face no consequences, while they remain answerable in court. They want reforms to ensure fairness, transparency, and a chance to give feedback on their superiors, but these pieces were all missing from the report.
Former officials had mixed reactions. Some supported shifting from a three-tier to a two-tier recruitment system to reduce promotion delays, while others defended the current ACR structure. A Criminal Investigation Department inspector said that most sub-inspectors retire with only one promotion, unlike constables who get more chances. Overall, frontline cops felt that the commission’s report failed to address real problems affecting morale and career growth.
One change has taken effect: the inspector general of police introduced the Police Dress Rules, 2025 – a comprehensive new dress code specifying rank-wise uniforms and accessories for all members of the Bangladesh Police. The new rules, published in a gazette on April 22, officially replace the previous dress code issued in 2004. Most notably, it includes a change to the police uniform, as the current navy blue attire has come to be symbolically associated with the July uprisings and the forceful actions taken by the police.
Despite the reform commission’s sweeping proposals, the grim reality on the ground paints a different picture of the police force. Crime continues to surge, despite the assistance of the Bangladesh Army and other security forces. Public trust in law enforcement remains fragile, and mob violence fills the vacuum left by institutional weakness.
From August to December 2024, 1,565 murder cases were reported, compared to 1,199 in the same months of 2023. Robberies also went up to 1,412 cases. Kidnappings increased from 463 to 642.
The beginning of 2025 showed the same trend. In January alone, 294 murder cases were registered, up from 231 in January 2024. Robbery cases rose from 114 to 171, and abductions more than doubled compared to the previous year. Mugging and street robbery also reached a high number, with 242 cases in one month.
Mob violence has surged alongside the overall rise in crime. According to the Human Rights Support Society (HRSS), 2024 saw the highest number of mob attacks in a decade, with at least 201 recorded incidents leading to 179 deaths and 88 injuries. The HRSS also reported that in just the first two months of 2025, at least 30 incidents of mob violence occurred, resulting in 19 deaths and 20 injuries.
While such violence – often triggered by suspicions of theft or robbery – has been a troubling issue in previous years, it has intensified since the political transition last August. In many recent cases, mob attacks have been linked to political retaliation rather than street-level crime.
Rights activists warn that the persistence of mob violence, even months after the interim government assumed power, highlights the fragile state of law and order and the ineffectiveness of the police force.
Dr. Tawohidul Haque, an associate professor and crime analyst at the Institute of Social Welfare and Research, University of Dhaka, noted that the police force has not progressed as expected since the regime change. In fact, he said, “in some cases, the performance drastically fell.”
Many officers close to the previous regime fled, and their replacements were often those previously stationed in less significant crime areas. This has created challenges, as the new officers are struggling to navigate what Haque described as a special and complex situation.
He also pointed to a breakdown in communication and trust between senior and junior officers. “The juniors can’t fully trust the seniors,” Haque said, particularly after seeing how those seniors had previously worked under an authoritarian government and then left them on August 5.
The police themselves have not been safe. After the political change, more than 450 police stations were attacked, burned, or damaged across the country. About 1,000 police vehicles were damaged or destroyed. The widely reported attacks of February and March of this year only continued that trend.
Many Bangladeshis still deeply distrust the police due to their role during the July-August uprisings and the force’s heavily politicized use during Hasina’s regime. The morale of police personnel is still very low. Many officers still feel unsafe and unsupported.
“Sometimes, standing alone at this signal to manage traffic feels truly frightening, especially when my colleagues have left for home or other duties. Usually, three of us are here, but emergencies often mean two are called away, leaving me alone,” Motahar Islam, a 47-year-old traffic police officer currently serving in the capital, told The Diplomat.
“The scenario of August 5, when police officers were hiding to save their lives, still haunts me as I had never witnessed anything so terrifying before. Now, reports of police being attacked across the country only add to the fear,” he continued.
“After a long, exhausting day dealing with thousands of people amid relentless honking and chaos, it’s genuinely unsettling to wear the uniform and head home alone.”
So far, the early reforms are mostly confined to urban centers, and the changes – like the new uniforms – remain symbolic when measured against the widespread dysfunction still gripping the force. Many of the deeper, structural problems persist, particularly in rural and peripheral districts where oversight is weaker and institutional inertia stronger.
To further the cause of community-centered policing, some officers have started attending local community forums. These efforts aim to reduce the gap between law enforcement and citizens, particularly after the brutal suppression of student protests that deeply damaged the police’s reputation. Yet public engagement remains minimal. Memories of past abuses – especially under Hasina’s regime – run deep, and fear still overshadows trust.
Internally, training programs have been introduced to orient officers with the five-step use-of-force model proposed by the Police Reform Commission. Yet these too are often poorly attended and inconsistently enforced. Many field officers continue to operate under older, informal norms, shaped more by institutional culture than reformist directives.
Meanwhile, rank-and-file frustrations – especially over promotion delays, arbitrary evaluations, and lack of protection from unlawful orders – remain unresolved. These festering issues have left officers feeling demoralized and increasingly vulnerable, both to public hostility and internal power games.
Shahinur Kabir, additional superintendent of police in Dhaka district (Savar Circle), emphasized that fear still lingers among constables and junior officers. He noted that cooperation between senior and junior ranks remains unstable. “There are 90 sub-inspectors under my supervision, but only about 20 to 25 are actively engaged in their duties. The rest appear less motivated. Still, we are doing our best to inspire them and regain their trust,” he said.
While the interim government’s gestures toward reform are notable, they have not yet translated into systemic transformation. The reality on the ground tells a more sobering story, one where fear, uncertainty, and institutional weakness continue to dominate. Police officers still go to work dreading mob attacks, political backlash, or scapegoating by their superiors. If meaningful revival is to occur, deeper structural changes and genuine political commitment – not just symbolic reforms – are urgently needed.
Judging by the fragile state of morale, rising crime, continued public distrust, and internal fracture and distance, much work remains to truly rebuild Bangladesh’s police force.