Yoga, which originated in ancient India, features many asanas (physical postures) focused on enabling the human body to find a fine balance, while stretching the limbs to achieve maximum flexibility. India uses yoga as a tool of its soft power, celebrating International Yoga Day on June 21 every year, and the present Indian foreign policy-making often mirrors such asanas. When faced with stark situations such as taking sides between warring states, New Delhi tends to fall back on a balancing act, avoiding taking sides and advocating diplomacy and de-escalation.
However, finding the right balance in matters of statecraft is a tough task, particularly when one side has been perceived to be favored over the other in the past, but those warm relations are no longer the same. India’s stance on the Israel-Iran conflict contains many such contradictions.
On June 22, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. In his brief call, they discussed the “current situation”; Modi expressed “deep concern at the escalations” and prescribed “dialogue and diplomacy” to restore “regional peace, security and stability.” Modi refrained from condemning the Israeli attacks, which started the war. Earlier that same day, the United States had carried out strikes on Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. None of this was mentioned in Modi’s subsequent tweet, although he did thank the Iranian president for ensuring “safe return and repatriation” of Indian nationals from Iran.
Contrast this with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s call to Modi on June 13, on day one of the war. Modi wrote on X that he had shared India’s concerns with Netanyahu. Modi has frequently referred to the Israeli leader as “my friend,” although not in the June 13 post. Modi emphasized the need for early restoration of peace and stability in the region. He did not express any overt support for Israel, and there was no call for de-escalation either.
A day earlier, on June 12, India had abstained from a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for an “immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire by all parties” in Gaza. The resolution demanded that “Israel immediately lift the blockade on Gaza and open all border crossings for aid deliveries.” India was among 19 countries that abstained and the only country in Asia to do so, while the resolution was adopted with 149 countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia, voting in favor.
A day after Netanyahu dialed Modi, India distanced itself from a statement issued by the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which condemned Israeli military strikes. Iran is a member of the SCO, as is India. New Delhi clarified that it did not participate in the discussions that finalized the statement. Nevertheless, on June 13, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar spoke to his Iranian counterpart, Sayyid Abbas Araghchi, urging him to avoid “any escalatory steps and an early return to diplomacy.”
In between these two phone calls and the diplomatic posturing in global and regional forums, New Delhi focused on what it usually does best in situations of war and instability, i.e. evacuating its nationals from both Iran and Israel, under Operation Sindhu. As airspace in Iran was closed, Indian students studying medicine in the country were moved by road to neighboring Armenia, from where special flights brought them home. Subsequently, Iran lifted the airspace closure to facilitate direct flights to India. Indians in Israel, on the other hand, travelled to Jordan and Egypt in two batches, from where they boarded flights home. These actions found resonance and appreciation at home.
New Delhi’s conversations with Tehran and Tel Aviv and its signaling to other major powers in multilateral forums provide a holistic picture regarding India’s position on the war. While New Delhi would like to retain the image of maintaining strategic autonomy and neutrality, and may even go to the extent of exploring a peacemaker’s role in the war, the fact remains that its foreign policy tilts in favor of one side, making balancing an arduous task and at times, relegating India to the status of an outlier without much influence in shaping the outcome.
India-Iran bilateral relations are one such case of a strong past but a fragile present. Over the years, under U.S. pressure, India’s crude oil imports from Iran have dropped to zero. India’s exports to Iran were worth $1.24 billion in 2024-25, and imports were negligible. Both countries’ strategic partnership agreement, signed in 2002, appears to be from a different era altogether. Their joint commission meeting, an annual affair, the latest edition of which was held on May 8, 2025, has only been customary. The Chabahar port in Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province, which is crucial to India’s Central Asia policy, is perhaps the only significant connection between the two countries. However, as long as Iran is under Western sanctions and Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers do not improve governance, the prospect of this port thriving to become a hub of international trade remains remote.
Contrast this with India-Israel relations based on $2.9 billion worth of defense purchases as well as rapidly expanding diversified merchandise trade. India is Israel’s second-largest partner in Asia for merchandise trade. From a mere $200 million in 1992, merchandise trade reached a peak of $10.77 billion (excluding defense) in 2022-23, before dipping, owing to the regional security situation and trade route disruption. Tel Aviv, which is crucial to the stalled India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project, remains a staunch supporter of the Indian counterterrorism approach, especially involving Pakistan. Netanyahu was one of the first world leaders to express solidarity with India after the Pahalgam terrorist attack in April 2025. Israel also steadfastly supported India’s strike on Pakistan.
This isn’t lost on Iran, whose relations with Pakistan have been strong, although marred by occasional rifts. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi visited Islamabad before his India trip in May 2025 and called for restraint during the India and Pakistan standoff, without expressly supporting New Delhi. Iran didn’t figure in the list of 32 countries that Indian delegations visited in May to lobby for support vis-à-vis Pakistan. Israel did.
In the past, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has raked up the issue of Kashmir and India’s treatment of its Muslim minorities, much to the angst of Indian authorities. This time around, India’s de-escalation prescription hasn’t pleased Tehran. Iran’s officiating deputy chief of mission in New Delhi, in a media interview, lamented the fact that India didn’t condemn Israel. New Delhi, however, has allowed limited and localized protests in the national capital that support Iran, but do not expressly criticize Israel.
The fact that India has lost much of its leverage in Iran and Palestine was highlighted by Sonia Gandhi, chairperson of the opposition Congress party, in a recent op-ed. She wrote that New Delhi’s “silence on the devastation in Gaza and now on the unprovoked escalation against Iran reflects a disturbing departure from our moral and diplomatic traditions.” However, Gandhi’s article is not expected to have much impact on official policy. The ruling political class may argue that its present stance is shaped by opinion of the people on the street, although the reverse could also be true.
A prolonged Iran-Israel conflict could have put India’s “neutrality” to the test. As the 12-day war enters a fragile ceasefire, New Delhi has an opportunity to reconsider and rework its West Asia policy, positioning itself as a peacemaker in the region. Beyond balancing, India needs to develop a multipronged approach to secure its defense and economic interests, not through a short-term transactional approach, but a long-term strategy of using deft diplomacy and building stakeholdership for conflict resolution.