At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned that China’s threat to Taiwan “is real, and it could be imminent,” citing the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) preparations for a potential invasion by 2027. Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, vice president of China’s People’s Liberation Army National Defense University, rebuked Hegseth’s speech by dismissing these remarks as “groundless accusations against China.”
Despite Hu’s scolding, Hegseth’s strident message is not without evidence. China has stepped up its coercive activities to pressure Taiwan. Beijing’s military drills around the self-governed island have become the norm, with ships, aircraft, and artillery involved to simulate a blockage of the island. Beijing is signaling preparations for full control of areas within the First Island Chain – the string of islands encompassing Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and parts of Indonesia.
The scale and frequency of these drills expose critical vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s supply chains. Most notably, the island’s energy imports – such as crude oil and petroleum – depend heavily on maritime shipping routes that are highly susceptible to disruption. Even a limited Chinese blockade that aims at asserting partial control over the island could sever these lifelines and thrust Taiwan into an unfortunate position, triggering a regional crisis while remaining under the threshold of outright war.
While depicting China as a rising “hegemonic power” intent on dominating and controlling “too many parts” of Asia, Hegseth called for Washington’s Indo-Pacific allies to boost defense spending, He underscored the need for collective deterrence against Beijing’s ambitions. It’s both urgent and critical to establish a security umbrella among like-minded partners to prevent China from taking Taiwan by force, but building such a security mechanism requires time, coordination, and sustained effort.
U.S. commitments, however, could go a long way in alleviating Taiwan’s security concerns. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth underscored the Trump administration’s resolve to strengthen the United States’ Indo-Pacific posture and expand support for allies and partners. As stated by Hegseth, the Indo-Pacific is “our priority theater,” where the futures of the U.S. and its allies “are bound together.” As a crucial node in the Indo-Pacific framework, Taiwan undoubtedly holds importance in the U.S. strategy of reengagement with regional allies and partners.
In a pointed message to Beijing, Hegseth stated, “We will not be pushed out of this critical region, and we will not let our allies and partners be subordinated and intimidated.” The Pentagon chief’s remarks deserve close attention, especially as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan over the next four years could surpass the $18.3 billion delivered during Trump’s first term.
The message of forging “deterrence” has been touted by U.S. officials. At a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in May, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that to prevent China from taking Taiwan, “deterrence is the key,” adding that “deterrence obviously begins with Taiwan’s own self-defense capabilities.” Hegseth’s rhetoric aligns with Rubio’s, as he underlined that regional countries should “reestablish deterrence.”
The U.S. officials’ call for Taiwan to boost its self-defense seems challenging, however. Taiwan currently spends about 2.45 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, and Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed that President Lai Ching-te has instructed the government to raise that figure to 3 percent. A recent survey by Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) found that 51 percent of Taiwanese support boosting the defense budget. Nevertheless, raising defense spending to 3 percent, 5 percent, or even 10 percent – as suggested by Elbridge Colby, Trump’s nominee for undersecretary of defense for policy in March – is a steep challenge for Taiwan.
Although the Lai administration could use “special appropriations” to meet the 3 percent target this year, this is a demanding task, as “government revenue hasn’t kept pace with GDP growth,” warned Jie Zhong, an associate research fellow at INDSR. Moreover, a large amount of money spent on defense could strain Taiwan’s economy amid mounting global trade pressures. The question remains: how far can Taiwan go to satisfy Trump’s expectations on defense spending?
Moreover, while Taiwan relies heavily – and almost exclusively – on the United States for arms procurements due to its diplomatic constraints, a more pressing issue lies in the persistent backlog of U.S. weapons deliveries. According to American Institute in Taiwan Director Raymond Greene, the ongoing delays are caused not only by “the strain on the production capacity of the U.S. defense industrial base,” but also by geopolitical factors – such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the surge in arms purchases from other countries in response to China’s increasingly aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific. Some scholars argue that these persistent delays are a key reason Taiwan’s defense budget has struggled to grow meaningfully. The absence of promised weapons is eroding public confidence, making it increasingly difficult for legislators to justify such spending to their electorate.
Taiwan’s defense strategy has steadily shifted toward asymmetric capabilities, such as mobile missile units, drones, and cyber defenses. In mid-May, Taiwan held the successful live-fire debut of the Land Sword II surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, marking a milestone in the island’s self-reliance and its growing capability to reinforce a “credible defense posture” against Chinese aerial threats. This progress aligns with U.S. advice for cost-effective deterrence.
In recent years, Taiwan has made notable strides in indigenous defense production, particularly in missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-drone systems, and submarines. Yet, Taiwan’s turn toward homegrown weaponry and an asymmetrical defense strategy has yet to meaningfully reduce its reliance on U.S. arms imports. Taiwan remains heavily dependent on U.S. imports for major systems, such as F-16V fighter jets and M1A2T Abrams tanks, due to its limited domestic capacity to produce advanced platforms.
Despite shortcomings regarding Taiwan’s homegrown defense production and the backlog of undelivered arms from the United States, Hegseth’s call for cooperation among like-minded states to strengthen deterrence against China’s aggressive posture offers Taiwan an opportunity to leverage U.S. and regional support, particularly from Taiwan’s growingly important partners like Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. Upholding a balance of power in the region is essential to deterring Chinese military adventurism and preventing a catastrophic scenario in the Taiwan Strait.
Now is a critical juncture for the United States to draw on its diplomatic influence and military strength to shape a collective approach to maritime security – one rooted in deterrence and close cooperation among allies. The Trump administration should take the initiative in forging this framework with key partners like Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, focusing on joint maritime drills, collaborative upgrades in defense technology, and seamless intelligence-sharing with Taiwan and others in the region. Such efforts would bolster “cross-strait deterrence” and provide a credible means of countering potential Chinese blockades and cyberattacks.
Another practical step that these like-minded states could embrace is to form a coast guard partnership directed at countering China’s gray-zone operations. Such maritime collaboration, once institutionalized, would enhance maritime domain awareness, improve interoperability, and forge a united front in the region. More importantly, it would send a strong deterrent message to Beijing, signaling that further escalation over Taiwan will not go unanswered.
On the strategic front, Hegseth’s position, which captures the Trump administration’s stance on countering Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, challenges the narrative that Trump might be willing to sacrifice the island. That perception has proven misleading. In essence, Taiwan is not a bargaining chip in a global game of diplomacy; its future is not up for trade.
While rhetoric is important in boosting Taiwan’s morale and determination, Washington’s concrete actions count more. The United States must give top priority to hastening arms deliveries to Taiwan and using its statecraft and expertise to rebuild credible deterrence through closer collaboration with Indo-Pacific allies and partners.