The Islamic Republic of Iran, under the leadership of President Masoud Pezeshkian, is noticeably strengthening its policy in Central Asia. The main focus of Iran’s regional interaction is aimed at developing trade and transport logistics links. This aligns with Iran’s “Look East” strategy, which is intended to mitigate Tehran’s economic isolation.
International sanctions remain the main obstacle to the Iran’s integration with Central Asia. Despite their geographical proximity and significant resource potential, the total volume of mutual trade remains relatively low at just over $1.5 billion, although this figure has grown slightly in recent years. Iran’s goal is to increase trade with Uzbekistan fourfold to $2 billion, while increasing trade with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to $1 billion each, and boosting trade with Turkmenistan by 30 percent.
The Central Asian states are, meanwhile, seeking out new consumer markets and more efficient connections to the world’s major economies. Iran combines both these qualities, making it a valuable partner for the region. Furthermore, Iran boasts solid scientific and technical expertise in engineering, energy, agriculture, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, and has an investment base for joint production.
Its extensive road and railway network, coupled with major ports in the Indian Ocean, gives Iran an important advantage in cooperation with the landlocked Central Asian republics. Tehran plays a pivotal role in the Eurasian Land Bridge connecting China and Europe by rail. Several overland transit routes from east to west pass through Iran by land, which also involve the Central Asian countries. The China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkiye-EU railway corridor is being actively developed, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkiye-EU multimodal route is operating in parallel.
The Iranian deep-water port at Chabahar is of particular interest to the Central Asian republics seeking to expand the southern transit direction. Chabahar is being modernized by India and thanks to its efforts, the port is not burdened by sanctions. In 2023, Tehran approved Tashkent’s request to join the Chabahar Agreement. The Uzbek side plans to build warehouses and a terminal at the seaport. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are considering a similar approach. Discussions are also underway to launch transport corridors from Central Asia to India using Iran’s road and port infrastructure. This would boost trade with one of the world’s largest economies, which is fully aligned with the geoeconomic interests of the Central Asian states.
In August 2024, container shipping began from the Indian ports of Mundra, Nhava Sheva, and Chennai to Uzbekistan via Iran (utilizing Bandar Abbas port) and Turkmenistan. In March 2025, cargo deliveries to Kazakhstan were organized along the same route. In addition, Astana intends to construct a specialized terminal and logistics center at the Shahid Rajaee port in southern Iran. These developments demonstrate the Central Asian states’ determination to strengthen their ties with Tehran.
Central Asian transit is also very important for Iran, given the reorientation of its foreign trade to the east. A full-fledged free trade agreement between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran came into force on May 15, 2025, providing for a sharp reduction in customs duties on most commodities. Russia, which is the dominant economy in the EAEU and has an impressive trade turnover with Iran ($4.8 billion in 2024), will benefit the most from the free trade agreement. However, China remains Tehran’s largest trade partner in the east. Non-oil bilateral trade was valued at $34.1 billion in the last Iranian calendar year, which ended on March 20, 2025. The development of transport corridors through Central Asia will presumably remain a key issue in China-Iran relations and an area of heightened attention going forward.