Those of us who’ve been following the saga of Thailand’s attempt to obtain a Chinese-built S26T Yuan-class submarine know there’s no perfect ending in sight. To recap, the biggest problem is the missing German MTU-396 engines promised in the contract. These are unfortunately off-limits to China under the European Union’s arms embargo, which has been more stringently enforced as geopolitical rifts have deepened. And so, for some time now, two realistic solutions are on the table for Thailand: accept the submarine powered by substitute Chinese CHD620 engines, or walk away empty-handed.
The Thai government, of course, has good reasons to explore alternatives, whether to swap the submarine for a frigate or to lobby Germany to permit the use of its engine. The lobbying has manifestly failed. At a meeting on May 13, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius made clear to his Thai counterpart Phumtham Wechayachai that Germany cannot accommodate Thailand’s needs. Everything falls back to the two options: take it as it is or leave it.
Phumtham, who has come around to the reality, added that ditching the deal means losing the 7-billion-baht ($214 million) installment already paid, over half of the total 13.5-billion-baht ($413 million) cost. The reasons are easy to guess. Not only is the submarine assembly nearly complete, but Thailand also knew–or failed to account for-that it was taking a gamble when it signed the contract. Despite its inconsistent enforcement over the years, the EU arms embargo against China has been in place since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.
A new layer of drama was added when word spread among Thai political commentators and netizens that Cambodia could receive the rejected submarine. Phumtham denied any knowledge of the rumor when asked. Meanwhile, the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) chief Adm. Jirapol Wongwit called on Thais to listen to official Navy statements, not online chatter.
Reasonable people would need no further elaboration on this silly rumor. For starters, it hardly seems strategic of China to risk alienating Thailand and sending it running back to its treaty ally, the United States. No doubt, the Thais would take issue with being pressured to accept Chinese engines. Inflaming a sense of unfairness toward Beijing is especially easy in light of the widening trade imbalance and Thailand’s tourism slump, driven in part by Chinese-led scam operations. But the reaction would be considerably worse if the submarine were handed to a neighboring country currently in a maritime dispute with Thailand. There’s a difference between an unhappy outcome rooted in unfortunate circumstances and a deliberate act of sabotage.
According to the leading defense outlet Janes, China has on more than one occasion offered to sell the half-built submarine meant for Thailand to Indonesia at a discounted price. The development caused no stir in Thailand, given the friendly and conflict-free nature of the Thai-Indonesian relationship. The Thailand-Cambodia relationship, in contrast, is openly hostile, arguably more than any bilateral relationship within ASEAN. Their border skirmishes from 2008 to 2011 over the Preah Vihear temple, and today’s heated tensions around Prasat Ta Muen Thom and Koh Kood island make the Thai-Cambodian animosity plain for everyone to see. In a Thai public opinion survey published by the Asia Foundation last June, Cambodia ranked highest among foreign countries viewed as taking advantage of Thailand. Close relations between the Pheu Thai and Hun Manet governments can only offer limited relief when a sensitive matter of sovereignty is at stake.
While China has not taken sides, it enjoys an “ironclad friendship” with Cambodia. This suggests, at least to Thailand, that China could back Cambodia if things go south. The submarine handover would only reinforce such an impression, reopening the door to deeper Thailand-U.S. security engagement.
Relatedly, it’s dismissive to assume Cambodia would accept anything and everything China offers – a common tendency among international observers. Even a totally free submarine might not be appealing if it’s labeled as a leftover from Thailand.
Moreover, Cambodia lacks any submarine capability. As opposed to the RTN, which used to operate four submarines and was the first in Southeast Asia to do so, the Royal Cambodian Navy has neither operational history nor publicly disclosed acquisition plans. Submarine capabilities can develop fast as the cases of Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam highlight. But Cambodia’s economy is comparatively less advanced. Considering that China would have to shoulder most of the financial costs and actual training, it might as well keep the submarine for itself.
The RTN’s stronger resolve to get its way is another thing. There’s no question that the RTN wants submarines. Initially, though, the RTN expressed serious reservations about using China’s CHD620 engines. Justifications for moving forward with the purchase, as observers, including myself, generally agreed, rested on the importance of maintaining good relations with China. Now, however, Pakistan’s successful incorporation of CHD620 engines into its Hangor-class submarines (modified from the Chinese Yuan-class) has provided great technical reassurance. Indeed, Pakistan’s positive experience as the first foreign user of China’s CHD620 has been cited by Adm. Jirapol. The combat prowess of China’s Chengdu J-10 jets, demonstrated during the recent dogfight between India and Pakistan, further indicates that perhaps Chinese technology has been severely underestimated.
The rumored Chinese submarine transfer from Thailand to Cambodia is already ridiculous on its own. Now, with the RTN highly likely to fight political obstacles and press ahead with the purchase, it’s dead in the water.