On May 15, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held a telephone conversation with the Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, marking the first ministerial-level contact between India and the Taliban leadership since the latter came to power in August 2021.
In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Jaishankar appreciated the “good conversation” with Muttaqi and shared that both sides discussed “ways and means of taking cooperation forward.” According to the Taliban readout, the conversation focused on “strengthening bilateral relations, trade, and enhancing diplomatic relations.”
While the Taliban statement made no mention of the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 or the recent India-Pakistan military clashes, in his post, Jaishankar appreciated the Taliban’s “condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack.” In the immediate aftermath of the attack at Pahalgam, the Taliban condemned the killings and highlighted how such incidents “undermined efforts to ensure regional security and stability” — but fell short of describing it as an act of terrorism.
In a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan, Jaishankar further noted that New Delhi “welcomed his [Muttaqi’s] firm rejection of recent attempts to create distrust between India and Afghanistan through false and baseless reports.” Previously, Pakistani military spokesperson General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry alleged that during India’s Operation Sindoor, several Indian missiles had landed in Afghan territory, a claim that was swiftly dismissed by both New Delhi and the Afghan defense ministry.
Notably, on the same day, Muttaqi organized the fifth round of the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral talks in Kabul, which focused on closer economic integration and deepening counterterrorism cooperation. Just days later, another informal meeting was held between Muttaqi, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, in Beijing, where they reportedly agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan.
A local Pakistani media outlet, citing unnamed diplomatic sources, reported that the three sides reached an agreement in Kabul to curb New Delhi’s strategic and economic footprint in Afghanistan. There are questions about the veracity of this claim. Still, it is clear that Islamabad is uncomfortable with a New Delhi-friendly Kabul due to its own security concerns. Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of using Afghan soil to fuel unrest in Pakistan through the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist groups.
Short of formal recognition, New Delhi has slowly but steadily been expanding diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. However, India has refrained from full engagement, focusing primarily on the distribution of humanitarian assistance, while infrastructure projects remain stalled. New Delhi’s hesitation stems from concerns about alienating former Afghan allies and losing goodwill among Afghan locals, who see India as a supporter of democracy and human rights in Kabul.
In the face of an increasingly hostile and constrained immediate neighborhood, New Delhi is expected to make “bold moves” on Afghanistan and “do whatever is necessary” in the near future to establish stronger relations with the Taliban. India’s outreach to the Taliban comes at a time when there has been a marked deterioration in New Delhi’s ties with its immediate neighbors, including Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives.
Even before Pahalgam, New Delhi had already made major concessions to the Taliban, including considering allowing a senior Taliban representative to oversee the Afghan embassy in New Delhi.
As part of their post-Pahalgam tit-for-tat punitive measures, both India and Pakistan suspended cross-border trade through the Attari-Wagah land route. Consequently, trucks carrying goods between India and Afghanistan were denied entry on both sides, severely impacting Kabul’s already weakened economy. A day after Jaishankar’s conversation with Muttaqi, India approved the entry of 160 Afghan trucks carrying dry fruits and nuts through the Attari border as a “special gesture.”
The Taliban are now pushing for more investment from New Delhi, which has so far invested more than $3 billion in over 500 projects across Afghanistan, including roads, power lines, dams, hospitals, and clinics. While these investments have helped New Delhi build its soft power influence in Kabul, they have limited strategic influence. More recently, Indian businesses have expressed interest in investing in Afghanistan’s mines, precious stones, oil, and gas, which the Taliban have been open to as they seek to secure a crucial revenue stream from the internationally competitive mining sector.
The Taliban are also keen to ramp up their trade relationship with India by using Chabahar port in Iran as a transit hub for Indian supplies into Afghanistan more regularly. Fears of U.S. sanctions have so far forced India to downplay the project, but in light of deteriorating ties with Washington following the India-Pakistan conflict, New Delhi has shown interest in reviving Chabahar’s role in regional trade. If successful, India’s trade with Afghanistan could substantially increase, fully bypassing Pakistan. In recent bilateral engagements, New Delhi has reaffirmed its commitment to promote the use of Chabahar port for supporting trade and commercial activities, including for the purpose of humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan.
So far, India’s Afghan policy has evolved in line with internal developments in Kabul and the global response. However, in light of the changed regional reality post-Pahalgam, New Delhi is looking to expand engagements with the Taliban to maintain a foothold in the region. India’s immediate challenge will be to complete its unfinished development initiatives, a long-standing demand from the Taliban side.
For their part, the Taliban will continue their multi-directional diplomacy, which was on full display during the India-Pakistan conflict. By engaging with India, Pakistan, and China, the Taliban government has signaled its preference for transactional relationships. Even as Muttaqi described India as an “important” country in the region during his conversation with Jaishankar, he reiterated the Taliban’s commitment to maintaining positive relations with “all sides” by “adopting a balanced approach.”
Recent interactions between the Taliban and Islamabad on pressing issues, such as Pakistan’s mass deportation of Afghan refugees, signal a thaw since relations frayed over cross-border airstrikes and military skirmishes in December last year. The relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban is being facilitated by China, indicating a growing Beijing-Islamabad-Taliban nexus, which is sure to generate anxieties in New Delhi.
Yet another concern for New Delhi is the Taliban’s constantly fluctuating position on Kashmir, which remains a divisive and contentious issue within Taliban ranks. In the past, the Taliban has gone from expressing solidarity with Muslims in Kashmir, to asserting that it is India’s “internal matter.” New Delhi risks over-expectation if it assumes the Taliban leadership would secure Indian interests, especially during a crisis.
As New Delhi reconsiders its Afghan policy, it should ensure that it is not subsumed under its Pakistan policy. Any policy reconfiguration has to balance the risk of backlash from the Afghan people, who already feel betrayed by New Delhi’s latest outreach. As a relatively new political actor, the Taliban do not have a track record of diplomacy. Without securing meaningful guarantees, New Delhi’s concessions to the Taliban may come across as opportunistic, driven by the desire to upset the interests of an old enemy.