Amid U.S. President Donald Trump’s idea of thawing relations with Russia in order to implement the “reverse Nixon” strategy (the idea of working with Russia against China, which is viewed as the biggest threat to the United States), China’s reaction has been calm, if not indifferent. But that does not mean that Beijing is not interested in getting involved in Ukraine after a possible ceasefire or peace deal. In fact, China has been signaling its interest in post-war Ukraine since at least 2023.
As I have argued for some time, China’s ideal outcome in Ukraine is a hybrid peace in which Russia is neither the undisputed victor nor the outright loser of the war. Either of the latter outcomes would be detrimental to China’s political and security interests. A victorious Russia will be a politically and militarily strong actor (with a trained army on the battlefield – a distinct advantage over China) and could pose a threat to China. A defeated Russia, on the other hand, could implode and create chaos in China’s immediate neighborhood.
Now it seems that U.S. attempts to talk to Russia over the heads of the Ukrainians and to sideline Europe will lead, sooner or later, to a hybrid peace in Ukraine. This will likely create a frozen conflict in which Russia effectively occupies part of Ukraine’s territory, but in which Ukraine has secured its existence and sovereignty.
Although Trump’s attempts to end the war have so far been in vain, and the U.S. administration is sending signals that it may withdraw from the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, it is a good time to consider what China might want to do after a (still-hypothetical) ceasefire and peace deal. Beijing is already preparing to get involved in Ukraine in one way or another, and that would pose a challenge for Europe and the United States.
China’s almost non-existent reaction to Trump’s Russia policy is good evidence that the current U.S. stance on the war in Ukraine and on Russia is beneficial for China. All the likely outcomes seem to benefit Beijing: a hybrid peace in Ukraine, a rapid deterioration of the transatlantic alliance, a possible softening of Europe’s stance toward China (in a bid to have leverage over Trump). Moreover, China’s calm attitude is also a confirmation that China’s leaders do not believe that a full or even partial “reverse Nixon” is feasible.
A hybrid peace would provide an opening for China to step into Ukraine. Recently, Beijing has been sending more signals that it is preparing for this step – although to date these signs are still subtle and not easily perceptible. After all, as a Chinese analyst I met recently in Beijing told me, China does not want to anger Vladimir Putin. The recent intensification of the Sino-Ukrainian dialogue at a rather low and working level – such as a bilateral agreement to extend the list of Ukrainian agricultural products to China, signed in early March – is a good example of this signalling. The deal is not very visible but is, in fact, substantial.
In addition, since at least the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in February, China has undertaken a muted charm offensive toward Ukraine. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart Andriy Sybiha on the sidelines of the MSC, said that Ukraine should be at the table during talks between Russia and the United States. In addition, China’s open support for the European Union to be involved in ceasefire and/or peace talks is also another subtle but telling signal.
However, the question remains as to what the signals are for. What might China want from Ukraine after a ceasefire and/or peace agreement, and what might China do – in concrete terms – to achieve this goal? The answer to the first question seems obvious: China’s interest is to expand its political influence in Europe in order to change the European political and security architecture in its favor. When it comes to the new security architecture in Europe, China is on an equal footing with Russia and has been very explicit about this at least since February 4, 2022, when the China-Russia joint communique was published. Ukraine seems to be a good place for China to test its ability to lure Europe and push back against the United States. To use Trump’s own words, China’s presence in Ukraine may allow it to collect “strong cards” to use against the U.S.
China’s involvement could potentially take two forms: participation in a peacekeeping mission and in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. These two areas could be closely intertwined.
While it currently seems unlikely, China has not unequivocally ruled out participating in a potential peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Evidence of this can be found in statements made by Chinese diplomats, such as China’s special representative for European affairs, Lu Shaye, who said in March that it was far too early to talk about sending peacekeepers to Ukraine, and added that the United Nations should make the decision. Chinese publications on the subject have also made an appearance. The fact that China has not clearly and officially withdrawn the possibility of sending its peacekeepers to Ukraine is very telling. This could be a kind of trial balloon sent to Europe and the United States.
Recent developments deserve special attention. A few days ago in Beijing, I was told that the option of China taking part in a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine is indeed open and that this topic has been discussed in China, with the caveat that such a mission would need to be under the auspices of the U.N. Then, last week, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun visited Paris and Berlin, and the main topic of his visit was peacekeeping and China’s role. Dong attended the 6th U.N. Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference in Berlin, delivering a speech at the event. It is well worth noting that the visit took place during the preparations for the Russia-Ukraine talks in Turkiye.
China is also interested in Ukraine’s reconstruction. This goal has been openly stated since at least early 2023, when “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis” was published. The final point of this document – often wrongly called a Chinese peace plan – states that China is ready to provide aid and play a role in post-war reconstruction.
With Beijing openly stating its interest in reconstruction, participation in a peacekeeping mission could serve as a preparatory phase and further other Chinese goals. Apart from presenting China as a responsible member of the U.N. Security Council concerned about peace in Ukraine, this could reduce international pressure on China as a Russian enabler. It would also allow China to visit areas where fighting has taken place, providing a unique opportunity to not only understand Ukraine’s reconstruction needs, but also observe how war was waged in Europe.
China’s signals about its future involvement in Ukraine remain subtle, and Trump’s talks with Russia are not bringing us closer to a ceasefire or peace deal. That said, Europe and the United States should consider China’s potential role in Ukraine. Beijing could skillfully seize the initiative and reap the economic and political benefits of its presence there before others do.
As we move toward a hybrid peace, one of the outcomes will be the consolidation of Sino-Russian alignment against the West, with the United States at the forefront. This would bring us closer to the reality of both China and Russia establishing themselves at the gates of the EU. The only way to prevent a Sino-Russian advance into Europe is to support Ukraine in winning the war, develop a European plan for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction, and accelerate the process of its accession to the EU. Otherwise, the situation could be much worse than we currently realize.